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Chapter 1
1. Statement of the Research Puzzle
The increased occurrence of military coups d’état after the Second World War,
more specifically in the 1960s and 1970s, gave rise to a growing interest in academia
to study this phenomenon. This rising academic trend was spearheaded by Samuel
Huntington, Samuel Finer and Morris Janowitz who embarked on studying different
administrative reforms that can help in submitting coercive apparatuses such as the
military institution to the civilian political will as a tool to limit coups d’état. Coups
d’état were framed as a radical involvement of the military institution versus the
regime incumbents. According to Edward Luttwak, a coup d’état is the infiltration of
a small, yet a critical segment of the state apparatus to oust the government and
deprive it from controlling the state apparatus.1 Whereas Curzio Malaparte argued
that a coup d’état is an instant where its essence lies in its technical problem; it is the
knowledge of when and how to overtake telephone exchanges, water supplies or even
the electricity generators besides the accumulation of political power.2 Coups d’état
were conceptualized differently among scholars, yet most of these conceptualizations
shared a common perspective about the military institution. This perspective entailed
that the military institution is a cohesive unit that is defined by bounding its members
to sustain one will, one organization and one mission.3 Military coups, regardless of
their different conceptualization, were similarly affiliated to the military institution as
one unit.
Evidence on this perspective could be found in the classic civil-military literature
introduced by Peter Feaver, Luttwak, Huntington, Zoltan Barany and others who dealt
with the military institution as one cohesive unit of analysis. The aim of this thesis is
not to challenge this perspective, yet to offer a micro-level analysis to the military
institution when it comes to radical military involvements in the civilian hemisphere
such as the case in military coups d’état. Henceforth, this analysis would not perceive
the military as one unit, but as an institution built upon the interactions of its
members. The nature of these interactions, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous,
could entail the cohesiveness or the dividedness of the military institution. By
extension, I would assume that cohesiveness of the military institution, as one unit,
might not always be the case, especially at moments of coup d’état.
Understanding the military institution as an institution based on the interaction of
its members would entail categorizing the interacting members of the military
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Edward Luttwak, Coup D'Etat: a Practical Hanbook- a Brilliant Guide to Taking
Over a Nation (London: The Penguin Press, 1969), 12.
2
Maurice Blanchot, Political Writings, 1953-1993 (New York: Fordham University
Press, 2010), xii.
3
W. Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat (Washington D.C.:
National Defense University Press, 1985), 9.!
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institution in terms of their military posts and their service branches that includes: air
force, navy, ground force and paramilitary force. This thesis would argue that at
moments of military coup d’états, the cohesiveness of the military institution as one
unit might not necessarily exist. A preliminary micro-level analysis of successful
instances of military coups between 1980-2013 d’état gave rise to a classification of
coups military coups into two coup types. The first coup type was entitled as “Infantry
Coups”. The coup agency formation of these coups included, whether intentionally or
unintentionally, only members who are affiliated to the ground forces. On the other
hand, the second category was entitled as “Mixed Coups”. The coup agency of these
coups included at least one member who is affiliated to a different service branch in
comparison to his fellow coup plotters.
Theoretically, members of the ground forces are the normal coup plotters as they
have sufficient training and equipment to accomplish the objectives of a successful
coup. Henceforth, what is quite puzzling is mixed coups. These coups include other
officers from other service branches; taking into account, the ability of ground forces
to execute the coup without the interference of other service branches. Therefore, the
question is why would the coup coordinator involve those whom he would not
tactically need for the coups’ execution. This is only one side of the puzzle that asks
why and how a mixed coup agency is formed. The second side is why would ground
forces officers prefer to act alone in other cases? These variations with regards to
coup agencies raised questions about the variables that can influence the coup agency
formation. In this dissertation, I would assume that the coup agency formation is
primarily dependent on two factors: First, the ability of the main coup plotter to liaise
between different military service branches. Second, the presence of a state of social
unrest that could be utilized by the main coup plotter, who can liaise between
different service branches, to convince officers from different service branches to
jointly execute a coup as a means to end “chaos”.
2. Research Significance and Method
The research has two significances of both a qualitative and a quantitative nature.
Qualitatively, this thesis would identify a research gap within the civil-military
relations literature on the military coup agency. The aim of this thesis is to identify
this literature gap, to bridge it and to extract possible knowledge from bridging it. The
gap lies in the conventional literature perspective on the military institution as one
unit. Bridging it would be through considering the military institution as an entity
based on the interactions between members who represent its service branches.
Whereas the knowledge extracted from the bridging process would be analyzing the
factors that influence the coup agency formation. The presence of different military
coup types signifies another question that is: Why is it important to distinguish
between different coup types? The importance of classifying military coups into
different coup types lies in perceiving the military institution as an institution that
might not be necessarily coherent. As if the military institution is coherent we would
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have only one military coup type that represents the “cohesiveness” of the military
institution. On the other hand, this dissertation would question the military
cohesiveness through investigating the military coup plotters behavior at moments of
successful coup.
Quantitatively, this thesis would introduce a new dataset that compiles information on
the coup plotters of the successful instances of military coup d’état between 1980 and
2013 with regards to their military posts, ranks, and affiliations to service branches.
Through this new dataset, one can test the theoretical assumptions proclaimed in the
qualitative part of this thesis. Building on this mixed method analysis (quantitative
and qualitative), one might abstract some factors that influence the coup agency
formations. The variable the thesis would highlight is the impact of social unrest on
coup agency. This does not mean that other factors such as military professionalism,
military social formation and others do not have an influence on coup agency.
3. Service Branches
In order to obtain a distinct understanding of a micro-level perspective on the
military institution, one must comprehend the military formations in terms of service
branches. The service branches symbolize the different affiliations of the coup
plotters that are discussed in this thesis. These branches/affiliations are: Ground
Force– Air Force– Navy – Paramilitary – Police.
3.1 Ground Force
The essence of any standing armed forces lies in its ground force. Historically,
ground force had been regarded as the first service branch ever introduced to the
military institution before the introduction of the navy and air force.6 Contemporarily,
this service branch became more sophisticated and included specialized divisions
such as: Artillery, Infantry, Special Forces, Cavalry and Mechanized Corps among
other divisions. According to Frank Newport and Alec Gallup, the success of any
warfare is purely dependent on the existence of a strong coherent ground forces that
can perform its tasks.7 Other for other service branches such as the air force and navy;
their objectives are mainly of a logistical nature. In other words, they mainly provide
transportation, naval and aerial protection besides their other offensive objectives.8
The members of the ground forces are trained and equipped to accomplish these
following objectives:

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6

Frank Newport and Alec M. Gallub, The Gallup Poll Opinion 2004 (Maryland:
Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 220.
7
Ibid., 221.
8
Ibid., 220-221.!
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•

Dislocate, Isolate, Disrupt and Destroy the Enemy:

This objective entails dislocating the enemy from strategic positions, isolating the
enemy from both supply and communication, disrupting the enemy’s transportations
and if necessary destroying the enemy.9
•

Seizing Large Urban Lands:

Only ground forces have the capabilities resembled in armor (tanks), infantry and
communications that allow them to take over a city and simultaneously maintain
control over it.10 In times of turmoil, there is a need for the ground forces to be spread
in populated cities for keeping order, and just in case to eliminate any rebellions
within this city with a minimum damage compared to air bombing or naval shelling. !
•

Seizing the Enemy Territory:

Members of the ground forces are highly trained to occupy areas in which the
presence of a militant state or non-state actors is perceived as a threat to the military
institution.11
One can notice that members of ground forces have sufficient equipment and
training that enable them to execute a successful coup according to Blanchot’s coup
definition. In addition, the primary dataset analysis proved that ground force was the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9

Norman Wade, The Army Operations & Doctrine Smartbook: Guide to FM 3-0
Operations & the Six Warfighting Fuctions (Lakeland: The Lightening Press, 2008),
39.
10
William G. Roberson, Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations
(Kansas, Command and General Staff College Press, 2003), 214.!
11
Chanakya, Kautilya The Arthashastra (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 619.
!
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only service branch that can execute a coup d’état without the involvement of the
other service branches.
3.2 Air Force
Aerial vehicles were first utilized in warfare with the introduction of Zeppelincrafts by Britain and Germany in the late 1880s.12 Almost three decades later, France
and Italy integrated military grade aircrafts to their militaries by 1909.13 Of the 170
independent countries of the world, about 135 countries have integrated air force into
their respective military institutions. Air force is believed to be the most sophisticated
service branch within any military institution. Its members are required to receive
advanced trainings to empower them to achieve the following objectives:

•

Air Supremacy:

The primary objective of the air force is to provide air supremacy to the other
service branches within the armed forces. Air supremacy could be defined in terms of
providing aerial support and protection for strategic positions, ground force and
navy.14
• Destroying/Weakening Enemy’s strategic:
The second objective of the air force regiments is to destroy power centers. This
objective is the opposite of air supremacy, as the air force is required to destroy the
enemy’s strategic positions. These strategic positions could entail enemy’s military
camps, air bases, ports, naval fleets and symbolic structures such as the parliament or
the presidential palace. According to Milan Vego, the ability of the air force to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12

Robin Higham, One Hundred Years of Air Power and Aviation (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1972), 19.
13
Australia Air Force Handbook: Strategic Information and Weapon Systems
(Washington DC: IBP, 2013), 249.
14
Milan Vego, Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice (Newport: Naval
War College Press, 2000), 65.
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destroy the enemy’s strategic positions could entail destroying the will of the enemy
to fight, as the case in the Six Days War between Egypt and Israel.15
According to the primary dataset analysis, air force members were involved in the
coups d’état, yet these members were not able to execute a coup independently
without the aid of other service branches, more specifically, the aid of the ground
forces. An explanation for this finding might be due to the lack of sufficient training
and the required equipment to execute a successful coup independently.
3.3 Navy
Navy is the third major armed forces service branch. It represents a fleet of
waterborne military vessels that is specifically designed for naval warfare. Navy as an
armed branch could be dated back to the days of the ancient civilizations such as the
Greek, Egyptian or Roman.16 Navy has its distinctive feature that separates it from
other armed service branches as its uniqueness is related to naval warfare. By
extension, its members are primarily trained and equipped to accomplish the
following objectives:

•

Sea Supremacy:

Sea supremacy is a term used to refer to the dominance of naval warfare through
two main aspects: 1- protecting the naval borders of a country. 2- Destroying /
Occupying enemy naval assets such as frigates, carriers, or enemy’s ports.17 The term,
sea supremacy, came up due to the presence of advanced naval warfare assets difficult

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15

Milan Vego, Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice, 71.
David Abulafia, The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 209.
17
Craig L. Symonds, The Naval Institute Historical: Atlas of the U.S. Navy
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 178.
16
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such as submarines, naval mines and torpedoes; therefore the term was coined to
emphasize the sea supremacy as a duty of the navy against all these difficulties.18
•

Destroy Enemy Strategic Position:

The second objective of the naval forces is to provide support for the ground forces
in terms of destroying the enemy’s strategic positions that might stand as a hindrance
against the main ground force. This objective might include shelling military camps
or even applying a naval blockade that cut the supplies for the enemy’s forces.19
Some successful coup instances included coup plotters from navy. However, navy
coup plotters were not able to execute a successful coup d’état independently without
the involvement of the ground forces between 1980 and 2013. An explanation for this
could lie in the lack of sufficient training and equipment for navy personnel to
execute a successful coup independently.
3.4 Paramilitary
Paramilitary force could be defined as groups or entities that might be distinct from
the military forces, yet it resembles the ground force branches in the sense of
organization, some equipment and training.20 Paramilitary forces might be under the
command of the police such the Central Security Forces in Egypt or directly
commanded by the President.21 These forces are properly trained, yet are dominantly
used for specific types of warfare such as counter-terrorism, riot control or providing
security for executive officials who do not trust the military.22
Some successful instances of coups d’état recorded the involvement of the
paramilitary forces such as the case in the Turkish 1980 coup. However, there were
no successful instances that were fully executed by the paramilitary force in the
presence of a standing military institution from the year 1980-2013. The only
exception was found in the coup case of Lesotho in 1986, and by 1986 the
paramilitary force of Lesotho was the only active coercive apparatus besides the
police force in Lesotho.
3.5 Police
Police is a civilian constituted body of the law and the state that aims at enforcing
the law, protecting property and limiting civil disorder. To do so, they have legitimate
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18

Milan Vego, Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas (London: Frank Cass
Publishers, 1999), 111.
19
Ibid., 111-112.!
20
Judith McCloskey and Harold Johnson, Balkans Security: Current and Projected
Factors Affecting Regional Stability (Pennsylvania: Diane Publishing, 2000), 9.
21
Anthony Cordesman, The Military Balance in the Middle East (Washington D.C.:
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 185.
22
Ibid,. 185-186.
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use of force. In some states, like Egypt, the police might have under its commands
special forces or paramilitary forces.23 In other cases, it is an independent body from
other service branches. The assistance of the police would be a bonus for coup
execution and success; yet, it is not a decisive factor due to the presence of stronger
coercive bodies such as the other military service branches and paramilitary forces.
4. Thesis Overview
The work is presented in self-contained chapters. Chapter 2 would present the
thesis’s theoretical framework. This framework would conceptualize a three-level
processes associated with military coups as wells as proposing different theoretical
hypotheses that address the variations in coup coordinator’s behavior at the moment
of recruiting the coup associates. In chapter 3, I would present the new coup agency
dataset and utilize it to check the validity of the hypotheses proposed in chapter 2.
The fourth chapter would introduce two successful moments of mixed military
coup that took place in Thailand 1991 and Turkey 1980. Both cases would illustrate
the different processes and hypotheses proposed in chapter 2 and later tested in
chapter 3.
The fifth chapter would present two successful moments of infantry coups that
took place in Haiti 1991 and Niger 2010. These two cases had different coordination
levels as well as different pre-coup statuses. These cases would give examples on how
infantry coups are evaluated, coordinated and executed in two distinct circumstances
with regards to the presence/absence of social unrest.
The case selection for chapter 4 and 5: the cases of Turkey 1980, Thailand 1991,
Haiti 1991, and Niger 2010 was designed to encompass several aspects to accurately
represent the studied sample in the new dataset. First, the case selection covered
different case studies that represent the geographical distribution of the sample in the
three continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Second, the selected cases studies
covered the studied timeframe from 1980 as in the case of Turkey, 1991 as in the case
of Haiti and Thailand and 2010 as in the case of Niger. Third, the case selection
covered different regime types such as constitutional monarchies as in the case of
Thailand or republican systems such as the case in the other cases. Finally, the case
selection regarded social unrest as a determinant factor in explaining the different
coup agency formation, and by extension, showed how and why a specific coup type
was influenced by either the presence or absence of social unrest.
Finally the sixth chapter would conclude the thesis through offering a summary to
the quantitative and qualitative research applied in the thesis. In addition, it would
signify the importance of studying the military agency in studying civil-military
relations in general and coup d’états in specific as well as addressing limitations of
the thesis.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Anthony Cordesman, The Military Balance in the Middle East. 185.
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Chapter 2
Theory
Edward Luttwak regarded the coup as a battle in which a segment of the state
apparatus would infiltrate and oust the regime incumbent through applying tactical
techniques. 24 These techniques included controlling the capital, transportation
facilities and others. This tactical perspective is outstanding in terms of understanding
how coups are executed; yet it is still insufficient to highlight how coups are plotted.
Eric Nordlinger perceived a coup as an indicator of some state apparatuses’
dissatisfaction with the regime incumbent. According to this perspective, a coup is a
form of a referendum instigated by those who intervene in politics to protect their
own interests represented in the preservation of institutions, class or authorities.25
However, this perspective merely tells us something about the motives of the coup
and lacked elaboration on the process through which motives such as the protection of
interests were translated into a collective action through which a coup is ultimately
executed. This thesis oversees the coup as a process that starts with an opportunity
exploited by the coup plotter. This opportunity, in order to be fully exploited, should
be studied and evaluated by the plotters if they are to succeed. After the evaluation
process comes the coordination process that entails the procedures and tactics used by
the plotters for the sake of organization. Later comes the execution that is
accomplished by the illegal ouster of the regime incumbent through the usage of
force. Within these processes, several variations exist and I argued that one these
variations, the presence/absence of social unrest can have an impact on the coup
agency formation and by extension on the coup type.
Step 1: Evaluation
A coup d’état is a zero-sum game; it can either bring the coup plotters to power, or
it can result in their imprisonment, dismissal, exile and sometimes death.26 Therefore,
plotters, to ensure the highest probability of success, first engage themselves in an
evaluation process. This process is intended to acquire knowledge about the
strength/weakness of the regime. Holger Albrecht argued that plotters wait for a
moment of fragility that provides them with a window of opportunity through which
they can operate and oust the regime incumbent.27 This moment of fragility could be
caused by an uprising, general grievance among the armed forces, civil war, death of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Edward Luttwak, Coup D'Etat: a Practical Hanbook, 12.

25

Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coup and Governments (New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 1977), 78.
26
Jonathan Powell, “Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups D'etat,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 55, No. 6 (2012): 1019.
27
Holger Albrecht, “The Myth of Coup-Proofing: Risk and Instances of Military
Coup d’états in the Middle East and North Africa, 1950-2013,” Armed Forces and
Society, (2014): 5.!!!!
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the regime incumbent or other forms that would give a reason for military personnel
to intervene in politics. This intervention is “legitimate” according to the coup
plotters, as they consider the armed forces as a “bulwark against chaos and
instability.” 28 A hypothesis was introduced by Clayton Thyne stated that the
likelihood of coups is directly proportional to the regime fragility.29 As the regime
grows weaker, plotters would have a tendency to make use of this weakness through
waiting for the right moment to execute. When the Thai Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra interfered with the courts and legislature in 2006, he sparked a social
grievance within both the armed forces and the judicial power in Thai. This grievance
was further amplified when Shinawatra challenged other opposition parties causing an
electoral anarchy; some of these parties refused to take part in the parliamentary
election.30 This chaotic environment could tempt some military personnel to become
coup plotters, and this temptation is dependent on the increased probability of the
success of the coup that is also dependent on how fragile the regime is. In 2006
Thailand, the military evaluated the anarchy, knew that the regime is ineffective, and
made use of the opportunity to oust Shinawatra.
Another form of regime fragility was noticed in Niger by 2009 when President
Mamadou Tandja, a former military officer who participated in the 1974 coup in
Niger, considered changing the constitution. This change, at that time, entailed
allowing the president to run for a third term. On the other hand, the Nigerien
constitution only allowed the president to run for two terms.31 Opposition went to the
streets, and Tandja was announced as a dictator. This constitutional crisis decreased
the legitimacy of Tandja, and by extension weakened his regime. Plotters considered
this weakness as a window of opportunity to oust Tandja. In February 2010, while
Tandja was meeting his cabinet, soldiers stormed into the presidential palace and
captured the president.32 Soon after that, plotters declared on television that they
reacted to end the corrupted regime of Tandja and to end the tense political situation.
The Nigerien coup of 2010 and the Thai coup of 2006 support the argument proposed
by Albrecht, Thyne and Marinov that plotters engage themselves in an evaluation
process to evaluate the strength/weakness of the regime. Upon that evaluation, they
would react whether to execute the coup or to abort/delay their plans. Incidences of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Nikolay Marinov and Hein Goemans, “Coup and Democracy,” British Journal of
Political Science Vol. 44, No.4 (2013): 802
29
Clayton Thyne, “Supporter of Stability or Agent of Agitations? The Effect of U.S.
Foreign Policy on Coups in Latin America, 1960—99,” Journal of Peace Research
Vol. 47, No.4 (2010): 450.
30
Koompong Noobankong, “Rakadamnoen Avenue: Thailand’s transformative path
towards modern polity” in Transforming Asian Cities: Intellectual Impasse,
Asianizing Space, and emerging translocalities, edited by Wing-shing Tang and Nihal
Perera (New York: Routledge, 2013), 47.
31
Amy McKenna, The History of Western Africa (New York: Britannica Educational
Learning, 2011), 171.
32
Ibid., 172.!
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weakness presented in 2006 Thailand and 2010 Niger emphasize that the plotters
managed to exploit the turmoil in their respective countries to plan their moves.
Step 2: Coordination
As a tactical move, there is an aspect of coordination involved in the coup process.
Naunihal Singh emphasized that the whole coup process is based on what he called as
a “Coordination Game”.33 In this game, individuals are motivated to do what others
are interested to do. Consequently, the choices of these individuals are dependent on
the beliefs that others would choose the same. Plotters react the same way; they would
want to convince as many military actors as they need of the coup’s success. How?
Through generating common knowledge that the coup is essentially a fait accompli,
by common knowledge it is meant that officers know the potential success of the coup
and that officers know that other officers know that the coup would be a success and
has the support of the majority of the armed forces’ personnel and by extension selfneutralize themselves from either opposing or supporting the coup. To set an
example, military coup plotters know that they have hard power in terms of arms, and
they know that the targeted regime incumbent represented by the president does not
have sufficient arms to stand a chance against the plotters. What is most important for
the plotters at this moment is not how they would storm into the presidential palace,
as at this moment, the president would have a low chance of resistance and would
most likely surrender. On the contrary, what is most important for the plotters before
execution is to guarantee minimal resistance from those who are capable of resisting
them such other military actors who might be loyalists and have enough arms and
men to resist the coup plotters and terminate their plans. Here comes the role of
coordination, through guaranteeing sufficient military capability for a successful coup
execution. In addition, Coup plotters tend to convince the military actors that the
success of the coup is inevitable, and make it really clear that any potential resistance
would be minor and would be severely punished by the plotters. Through this
coordination, plotters guarantee the neutralizations of those whom they fear most.
The consequences of incoordination might be severe and could result in the failure
of the coup and a fatal fate for the plotters. Incoordination can result in what is called
as “coordinated attack problem”. 34 This problem is a consequent of
miscommunication between potential plotters and those who might resist or support
them. An example to the coordinated attack problem would be the coup attempt of
Spain in 1981. Plotters thought that seizing control over the Cortes and the strategic
locations in Madrid would compel other officers to either join them or stay neutral
and that the coup would be a fait accompli.35 The plotters had an illusion that a swift
control over the capital would be sufficient. The main reason behind the failure of this
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Naunihal Singh, Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups (Maryland:
John Hopkins University Press, 2014), 6.
34
Ibid., 7.
35
Barabra Geddes, “WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT DEMOCRATIZATION
AFTER TWENTY YEARS?,” Annual Review Political Science 2, (1999): 128.
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coup was of a coordination nature and in fact it was the coordinated attack problem.
How? The plotters did not generate sufficient common knowledge that their coup
would be a success and focused more on seizing symbolic structures. This gave time
to the king to call other officers who were able to resist the plotters. These actors of
resistance would not have had intervened if they knew well enough that they stand no
chance against the plotters. In addition, the king was able to generate a common
knowledge through his resistance to the plotters. This common knowledge, generated
by the king, led to the belief that other officers would more likely support the king. In
addition, each officer knew that each officer is more likely to support the king. This
led to the failure of the coup and a famous quote was said by one of the plotters: “next
time, cut the king’s phone line”.36 The essence of coordination is dependent on
several factors, two of which are common knowledge and the generator of this
common knowledge. In other words, the higher status the generator of the common
knowledge is, the more credited it would be as in the case of king Juan Carlos of
Spain in 1981. King Carlos was able to generate more credible common knowledge
that shaped the expectation of officers in the military institution. In turn, this
expectation led to the failure of the plotters in 1981.
Understanding this step in terms of a coordination game led to a three level
analysis, according to Naunihal Singh. These three levels are associated with the
status of main military coup coordinator/plotter. Singh classified the coordination
levels as follows: coups coordinated from the top, from the middle and from the
bottom.
2.1 Coordinators from the Top
Coordinators from the top are believed to have the highest rate of success, as 68%
of the coups that were coordinated by plotters from the top ranks of the armed forces
were a success.37 These plotters have the greatest amount of influence within the
military institution due to their influential posts in the military institution. Their
military posts empower them with exclusive privileges within the military institution
that can include: an access to intelligence about the reactions of the different ranks of
armed forces with regards to any incident, the ability to disseminate information that
they want to spread on purpose within the ranks of the armed forces, and finally the
ability to shape expectations for other officers before the coup in instigated.38 The
third aspect is quite important as it leads to the generation of common knowledge
favorable to the plotters incase the plotters were from the top. The third aspect is
interlinked with the execution, as plotters from the top are dependent on the middleranked officers for the sake of executing the coup. Yet before execution, these
middle-ranked officers must be convinced through common knowledge that the coup
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has a high success rate, other wise, they might not risk executing an illegal act such as
a coup.
2.2 Coordinators from the Middle
Coordinators from the middle represent the middle ranked officers; officers who
are in direct command of fighting and armed units. These units can vary from squads
to brigades. The distinctive aspect of these coordinators is that these groups tend to be
cohesive as a unit on its own, as these units are trained, equipped and mobilized
separately from other units.39 These coordinators’ ability of generating expectations
and by extension common knowledge to other fellow officers is more dependent on
firepower. This is why they would tend to act in secret and start generating
expectations within the execution process through seizing control over strategic
centers such as T.V and Radio. After they capture these centers, they would generate
common knowledge and proclaim a large support for the coup on one hand, and on
the other warn potential loyalists that they do not stand a chance of resistance. It is
noteworthy to highlight that that the success rate of coordinators from the middle to
stage successful coups is 48% in comparison to 68% of coups instigated from the
top.40
2.3 Coordinators from Bottom
Coordinators from the bottom represent the low-ranked officers such as junior
officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted/conscripted men. These coordinators
lack the extensive influence of the top-rank officers and the restricted influence of
middle-ranked officers. Their motives for coups are primarily instigated due to low
salaries or unbearable working conditions.41 Their ability to conspire is minimal as
they meet in large numbers in barracks, and they are always afraid of attracting
attentions. This is why they tend to conspire in parties or other social events such as
birthdays or weddings to avoid attentions. The ability of these coordinators to
generate common knowledge of the coup success is limited. This is why coordinators
from the bottom face harsh resistance from loyalists or other officers who reject the
coup, as every officer knows that every officer is more likely to stand with the
regime.42 The success of these coordinators is dependent on the outcome of the battles
with the loyalists and coup resistance. It is important to highlight that these
coordinators have the lowest rate of success, as only 32% of the coup attempts made
by coordinators from the bottom were a success.
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Step 3: Execution
The step that comes after evaluation and coordination is the coup’s execution
process. This step is the main tactical move staged by the plotters to transform the
plans they already evaluated and coordinated into actions. These moves are composed
of the following stages:
3.1 Neutralizing the Armed Forces
As illustrated in the Spanish case of 1981, the risk of encountering resistance from
other fellow officers in the armed forces might result in a fatal destiny for the plotters.
Therefore, plotters have a tendency to neutralize the armed forces through identifying
the key leaders of important squads or command centers that can intervene and resist
the coup plotters.43. The neutralization could be either active or passive. Passive
neutralization takes place when there is a common knowledge of the coup success
within the armed forces. This knowledge would entail other military actors would
self-neutralize themselves from acting against the plotters due to a belief or an illusion
that they do not stand a chance against the organized coup plotters. On the other hand,
the active form of neutralization takes place when the coup plotters neutralize any
resistance to the coup plans through the usage of force. Active neutralization could
also take bloodless forms such as seizing the armed forces high command centers to
avoid the generation of counter-common knowledge by the loyalists.
3.2 Neutralizing the Police and Paramilitary Forces
In order to neutralize these forces, coup plotter have to assess the strength of both
the police and paramilitary forces with regards to their numbers, stations, and
equipment. Later, the plotters should assess the loyalty of these forces through its
attachment to the regime.44 In case the paramilitary forces and police have enough
equipment to make the coup a failure, there would be a need to neutralize them with
the same means used by the army through occupying their stations, communications
and command centers. Yet, usually, these forces are quite bureaucratic due to their
long chains of commands and would most probably stay in their barracks posing no
threat to the coup plotters.45
3.3 Controlling Mass Media and Tele-communications
Controlling these facilities by the plotters is important due to two factors. First, it
helps the coup plotters to make a fact that the coup is already a success, and this fact
is quite important to neutralize potential resistance from other officers to new
incumbents. Second, plotters would be in a position to isolate the regime incumbents
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from either rallying support from outside the country or inside it at the moment of the
coup through using communicational assets.46
3.4 Neutralizing Political Actors and Power Centers
Neutralizing political actors and power centers could be represented in arresting
the president or the authority figure, put his/her political advisors under arrest and
arresting trade unions’ and regime’s figureheads. 47 Taking over political power
centers such as the presidential palace, the cabinet house and parliament has another
symbolic mean that is the triumph of the plotters over the regime.
3.5 Controlling Roads to and out of the Capital
Plotters tend to avoid the escape of state executives. Controlling the roads of the
capital allows the plotters to arrest the regime executives in case they fled their houses
or offices. Controlling roads is usually done simultaneously while taking over
telecommunications in order not to allow any of the regime executives to contact
other loyalists in person or through any other means.48 Furthermore, the presence of
tanks during a coup in the streets and square implies the success of the coup plotters
in controlling the city and give a general symbol to the coup plotters that their attempt
was a success.49
3.6 Controlling Airports and other Transportation Facilities
Controlling airports and other transportations facilities represents the supremacy of
the coup plotters in controlling the flow of individuals to the major cities. These
facilities are the means of fast transportation that can either bring loyalist troops to the
capital loyalist troops or offer an escape window for the ousted regime executives.50
Almost at all the instances of successful military coup, airports or even navy ports
were occupied and all trips were cancelled till further notice. Why? These
transportation facilities could lead to information leaks by travellers, and this
information leak might threaten the success of the coup, therefore, the plotters tend to
establish strict control over these facilities until the plotters’ control over the state is
ensured.51

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46

Catherine Conaghan, Fujimori’s Peru: Deception in the Public Sphere
(Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 28.
47
Kees Konnings and Dirk Kruijt, Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building
in the Age of Democracy (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2002), 24.
48
Edward Luttwak, Coup D'Etat: a Practical Handbook, 122-123.
49
Ali Rahnema, Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran: Thugs, Turncoats, Soldiers, and
Spooks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 218.
50
Naunihal Singh, Seizing Power, 110-111.
51
Ibid., 113.!
!

16!

The three processes introduced above are the theoretical processes through which a
military coup d’état is successfully executed. These processes could be illustrated as
follows:

4. Contributing to the Theory
The theoretical approach mentioned above has been previously discussed by
Singh, Albrecht, Marinov and Geddes. My aim is to contribute to theory through
introducing a better understanding to the coordination process. An elaborate analysis
of the coordination process can show us how different coup types happen. I would
argue that there are two major military coup types: mixed coup and infantry coup. As
previously mentioned in chapter 1, theoretically, members of the ground forces are
the normal coup plotters as they have sufficient training and equipment to accomplish
the objectives of a successful coup, and that what is quite puzzling is mixed coups. I
assumed that the answer lies in the network of the coup coordinator. If a coup
coordinator has the ability to liaise between different service branches in the presence
of a persuasive factor such as social unrest, it would be more likely that he utilizes his
network of connections to ensure that the coup is a fait accompli.
Although the coup coordinator might not tactically need members from different
service branches, he would need to neutralize these service branches for a smooth
execution process. By extension, if there were an option for the coup coordinator to
neutralize these secondary service branches through co-opting members of these
service branches into the coup plot, the coup coordinator would choose it to ensure a
successful execution process. In case the coup coordinator did not co-opt members of
these secondary service branches, then he would have to neutralize them through the
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use of coercive means as what took place in the case of Pakistan in 1999. When
General Musharaf was unable to co-opt the navy and air force commanders mainly
due to his limited influence as the commander of ground forces. Musharaf had to
make sure that the military high command and the commanders of the other service
branches were neutralized, therefore a part of his forces were ordered to detain the
commanders of the other service branches to avoid transforming his coup into a civil
war between different branches.52
The next section is dedicated to provide a theoretical understanding on how mixed
and infantry coup agency formation could be created.
5. Mixed Coups
A mixed coup is a coup instigated by military personnel who have different
affiliations with regards to their service branches. I presume that mixed coups are
contributed to three aspects:
•
•
•

First, the ability of the main coup coordinator to liaise among coup from
different service branches.
Second, if the coup is preceded by a moment of social unrest.
Third, the presence of different service branches within the armed forces

The ability of the main coup coordinator to influence other coup plotters from
different service branches could be measured by the amount of influence he possesses
within the armed forces. If we applied this method to the coordinators’ level, we
would find that coordinators from the top possess the highest level of influence within
the armed forces. Why? Because these coordinators are the general commanders of
the armed forces, which mean that they can command more than one service branch at
the same time. In addition, they can summon the commanders of these different
service branches to meetings where the general commander can propose his coup
plans. Consequently, I would assume that coordinators from the top are more likely to
coordinate mixed coups than their counterparts from the middle/bottom due to their
extensive network that can reach different service branches As for coordinators from
the middle/bottom, they would be less likely to coordinate with potential coup plotters
from different service branches merely because their networks is usually restricted to
their fighting battalions and in the best-case scenario to other fighting battalions
within their respective service branch.
However, the ability to liaise between different service branches is one thing, and
the ability to convince and influence these different officers who belong to different
service branches is another. Even though if a coordinator from the top is the general
commander of the armed forces, he could still risk rejection from his subordinates
with regards to his coup plans, as the coup is after all an illegal act. Therefore, I
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suggested that the presence of social unrest could be regarded as a persuasive tool
used by a coordinator (who can liaise between different service branches) to convince
his fellow coup plotters of the need of this illegal act to restore social peace.
The state of social unrest could be represented in several aspects that generate a
general grievance or defiance against the regime. It can be represented in popular
uprisings, organized mass protests, civil wars, the sudden death of an authoritarian
president and other aspects that can disturb the social peace within the boundaries of a
certain state. If this state of social unrest existed, the military coup coordinator can
use it to convince potential coup plotters to stand as a “bulwark against the chaos”
caused by social unrest.
Due to the impetuous nature of social unrests, the coup coordinator would need to
act spontaneously. In other words, he must have the ability to evaluate fast, coordinate
fast and execute fast. So who can accomplish these objectives efficiently within the
armed forces? I would again assume that coordinators from the top are more likely to
react spontaneously than their counterparts from the middle/bottom. These
coordinators have enough assets due to their military privileges that enable them to
acquire information about the state of social unrest before any of their counterparts.
This information could help them to evaluate efficiently, and to represent their coup
plans to their subordinates based on credited information in the coordination process.
On the contrary, coordinators from the middle/bottom would relatively need more
time to organize themselves. As they would relatively need time to evaluate instant
moments of social unrest, and even a longer time to liaise between potential coup
plotters.
Finally, mixed coups are based on the presence of different service branches within
the armed forces. If a given country does not possess service branches such as air
force or navy, then officers from different service branches would not exist in the first
place. By extension, any military coup that might happen in these countries would be
an infantry coup. For example, the Maldives only possesses what they call the defense
forces (Ground Forces) and has no records of other service branches such as air force
or navy.53 Therefore, any military coup/coup attempt that took place or will take place
in the Maldives would not be a mixed coup, unless the Maldives decided to change its
military organizational and introduces navy and air force. This is to justify the need to
consider the military organizational structure if we are to study coup types that are
classified according to the same organizational structures.
Building on the mentioned assumption, two possible hypotheses could be induced
on the condition that the given country possess other service branches rather than the
ground forces:
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Hypothesis 1: Coup plotters are more likely to include officers across service
branches when the coup is preceded by social unrest, which represents a persuasive
reason that tempts other potential coup plotters to engage in an illegal action such as
a coup.
Hypothesis 2: Mixed coups are more likely to happen in case the coordinators are
from the top of the armed forces due to the ability of the coordinator to liaise between
different service branches.
•

Mixed coups could be illustrated as follows:

!
!
6. Infantry Coups
Infantry coups, like mixed coups, are a product of a specific coordination level,
which is in this case a coordination of an exclusive nature among military actors from
the ground forces. This exclusiveness is the distinctive nature of infantry coups that
differentiate them from other coup types. Infantry coups could only happen in the
following cases
•

•

!

First, if the coup is taking place in a country that has no air force or navy, then
the exclusivity of the coup agency is contributed to absence of other service
branches.
Second, if the coup is taking place in a country that has air force and navy,
then the exclusivity of the coup agency would be either:

20!

!
Intentional: coordinators can influence other service branches,
yet chose to act exclusively without the involvement of other service
branches.
!
Unintentional: coordinators lack the power to influence other
service branches, and it was their only option to act alone.
I am willing to investigate here the execution of infantry coups with regards to the
second scenario, as in the first scenario there is no option of a mixed coup unless their
armed forces included different service branches.
6.1 The Intentional Scenario:
In this scenario, the main coup’s coordinator has the ability to influence other
service branches such as navy or air force, yet he would choose his coup associates
from a specific branch that is the ground forces. Why? There would be an infinite
number of reasons that might prompt these coordinators to be selective. For instance,
if there were no persuasive reason that can convince the potential coup plotters from
other service branch to join the coup, henceforth, why would the coordinator risk
unveiling his plans to whom he cannot convince? A second possible reason could be
trust; in other words, the main coup coordinator would only generate common
knowledge of his coup plans to men whom he trusts. Both examples could entail all
the coordination levels, top-middle-bottom, depending only on the ability of the
coordinator to influence other service branches that is more likely to be the case with
coordinators from the top.
6.2 The Unintentional Scenario:
This scenario entails that the coordinator is unable to influence other service
branches due his limited sphere of influence within the armed forces. If that is the
case, then we will have to exclude the coordinators from the top and focus only one
those coordinators who have limited or no influence such as the coordinators from the
middle or the bottom.
Would infantry coups take place at a moment of social unrest? It depends on
depends on the ability of the coordinators to make use of the instant common
knowledge; to evaluate fast, coordinate fast and execute fast. I assumed before that
coordinators from the top such as the Minister of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff
are more likely to make use of this unpredicted action such as social unrest. However,
this does not mean that coordinators from the middle/bottom cannot make use of
social unrest and execute successful coups. However, it is more likely that
coordinators from the middle or the bottom be selective and exclude other service
branches due to their restricted influence.
Would infantry coups take place when there is no social unrest? I would assume
that coup coordinators, regardless of their coordination level, would be less likely to
include officers from different service branches due to the absence of a persuasive
!
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reason such as the state of social unrest, which by extension can convince these
variety of officers to engage in an illegal act such as coups.
Building on this argument I would assume the following two hypotheses on the
condition that the given country possess other service branches rather than the ground
forces:
Hypothesis 3: Coup plotters are more likely to exclude officers across service
branches when the coup is not preceded by social unrest.
Hypothesis 4: Infantry coups are more likely to be coordinated from the middle or the
bottom of the armed forces due to the limited ability of these coordinators to influence
other service branches.

!

Infantry coups could be illustrated as follows:
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7. Operational Definitions:
•

•

•
•

•

•
•

The Military: An institution whose cohesiveness is dependent on the nature of
the interactions among its military members who have different affiliations
with regards to their service branches.
Military Coup D’état: a process that starts with an opportunity evaluated the
coup coordinator who exploits the opportunity to coordinate among his coup
associates for the sake of the illegal ouster of the regime incumbent through
the usage of force.
Successful Military Coup D’état: The illegal ouster of a regime for at least one
week by the military coup plotters.54
Mixed Military Coup: a coup d’état instigated by military personnel whose
coup agency formation includes at least one officer from a different service
branch.
Infantry Coup: a coup d’état instigated exclusively by members of the ground
forces without any involvement of military personnel from other service
branches.
Military Coup Plotter Agency: the affiliation of a coup plotter to a certain
service branch within the armed forces.
Social Unrest: incidents triggered by a combination of deteriorating living
standards such as income inequalities, economic backwardness, lack of
political freedoms, alienation of certain segments within the society from
certain rights and the lack of political accountability and representation.55
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Chapter 3
Military Coup Agency Dataset
This chapter would address a new dataset on coup agency to check the validity of
the hypotheses assumed in the previous chapter. This dataset is a derivative of “the
instances of coup/ coup attempt” dataset introduced by Jonathan Powell and Clayton
Thyne. Both authors gathered significant data on global instances of coup d’état
starting from the year 1950. The new data would identify the coup agency formation
of each military coups d’état across the data from the year 1980 till 2013 according to
Powell and Thyne’s dataset. In the next section, I would present how Powell and
Thyne’s conceptualized coups d’état, coup’s success versus failure and coup
coordinators. Later on, I would show how the new dataset utilized these
conceptualizations. And finally, I would offer an overview of the new dataset as well
as testing the hypotheses assumed in the previous chapter.
1.1 Coup
Powell and Thyne conceptualized coup as the instance of ousting the chief
executives of the regime through the illegitimate use of force. 56 This
conceptualization allowed the author to differentiate between coups and less extreme
actions that target the political leadership. For instance, Nepalese police personnel
revolted on their superiors in 2008 due to humiliating nutrition conditions. This event
could be merely described as a mutiny not as a coup. Why? Because the chief
executive Prime Minister Girija Koirala was never challenged or forced to resign by
the mutineers.57 Another example was in the case of Argentina in 1959; the military
pressured the president at that time, Arturo Frondizi to impose harsh measures in
1959 that led to an increasing social grievance against the President. In addition, the
military high command called for the resignation of his cabinet afterwards. This
instance was not coded as a coup, for President Frondizi was able to secure his office
due to successful economic reforms that gained the consent of the citizens. In
addition, the military did not remove him through the use of coercive means.58 For
Powell and Thyne, a coup/coup attempt is conditioned by the illegality of the coup
action. In other words, the act of ousting the chief executives should be an illegal act.
This condition permitted the authors to distinguish between coups and political
pressures as a chief executive might be legally ousted if a parliament or a court
legislated the removal of the chief executive. For instance, in 2009 Honduras, the
Supreme Court made a constitutional order that obligated the military to arrest
President Manuel Zelaya.59 This instance, according to the authors, should not be
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considered as a coup, as the ouster of President Zelaya was based on a legal
framework. Therefore by adding the illegality aspect to instances of ousting
executives, one can differentiate between instances of coup/coup attempt and political
pressures or judicial sentences that also might lead to the ouster of the regime
incumbent.
1.2 Coup Coordinator
For Powell and Thyne, coup coordinator is a category that might include civilian,
military or mercenary actors who participate in the coup process as long as the
coordinator is a part of the state apparatus.60 Identifying the plotters in such a way
allowed the authors to have three advantages. First, it allowed them to exclude coups
d’état from other anti-regime actions. For instance, a popular uprising or a revolution
could be instigated by members who are not necessarily a part of the regime and still
oust the regime. If the definition of the coup perpetrators is broad enough to include
actors outside the regime, as Janowitz had suggested before by stating that the
perpetrators need only to be organized, then domestic actions such as popular
uprisings or a revolution could be conflated with coups. 61 Second, this
conceptualization does not conflate between coups and radical changes enforced by
international powers. For instance, the Iranian coup of 1953 was unlikely to happen
without the endorsement of the CIA, yet it was Iranian agents within the state
apparatus who executed the coup, and this is why it was counted as a coup. On the
other hand, the U.S invaded Iraq in 2003, yet this instance did not constitute a coup
because the foreign powers were the primary actors who ousted the regime. Third,
widening the definition of a coup coordinator to include non-military actors would
avoid potential biasness contributed to a narrow perspective on coup coordinators that
is only limited to military actors.62
1.3 Coup Success/Failure
Some coups attempts were instantly put down by loyalist forces on their onset.
These attempts were easily coded as failures due to instant counter-attack of the
loyalists on the coup plotters. Other instances were coded as a coup attempt, and were
not put down instantly such as the case in the U.S.S.R in 1991; the plotters were able
to successfully depose Gorbachev for 3 days, yet ultimately they were defeated.
Conceptualizing a coup’s success/failure is academically debatable due to the
arguments over what stands for a coup’s success or failure. Consequently, the authors
preferred to conceptualize the coup’s success using a definition that was commonly
agreed upon in the academic hemisphere. This definition was introduced by William
Thompson and it argued that a coup could be counted as a success if the post-coup
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regime was able to survive for at least a week.63 By extension, if this regime was
incapable of surviving for at least 7 days, then the coup would be counted as a failure.
Other scholars such as Rosemary O’kane argued that coup’s success or failure could
be determined by the ability of the coup coordinators to install a government of their
own choice.64 For the authors, this measurement would be quite arbitrary, for it would
be illogical to label a coup as a failure based on the plotter’s failure or inability to
install a government of their own choice. For instance, in 2005 Mauritania, the
military coup plotters deposed El-Taya regime, and prevented any military member,
including themselves from participating in politics or choosing the government.65 If
one applied O’kane’s perspective, then what took place in 2005 Mauritania would be
counted as a coup attempt. Henceforth, the authors opted to use an empirical value to
measure either success or failure. This value is counted in days to avoid arbitrary
interpretations of coup success or failure that are based on qualitative understandings.
In the next section, I shall introduce the new dataset and how it was
conceptualized.
2. The New Dataset
The new dataset identifies the coup agency as a tool to apply an in-depth analysis
to coups d’état. Different sources were used to gather the new dataset. These sources
included national constitutions, autobiographies, news articles, and academic
literature available on the respective instances of coups d’état. Although the new
dataset is a derivative of the dataset introduced by Powell and Thyne, there are some
noteworthy differences that I must state. First and foremost, the new dataset was
limited only to 33 years, from 1980 till 2013, instead of the 63 as offered by Powell
and Thyne. In addition, it selected only successful instances of coups d’état and that
limited the dataset into 77 successful instances of coup d’état.
2.1 Data Gathering
The new dataset was gathered through a case-by-case research on the 77 successful
coup instances that took place from 1980-2013. This research was dependent on the
availability of literature on each case. The literature used in research encompassed
constitutions, national court sentences, newspaper articles, autobiographies, released
intelligence documents, official reports by Ministries of Defense, United Nations
Resolutions and secondary source that included books and academic journal articles.
The research focused on gathering the following aspects:
•
•

The name and ranks of the military coup plotter/plotters
The coups’ coordination level
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•
•
•

! Coordinated by a military coordinator from the top
! Coordinated by a military coordinator from the middle.
! Coordinated by a military coordinator from the bottom.
The commanding post of the coup plotter/plotters at the instance of the
coup, if existed.
The affiliations of the military coup plotters’ to a military service branch,
if existed.
The coup status: whether the coup was preceded by social unrest or not.

The next section would show how these aspects were conceptualized as well as the
distinctions between the conceptualization of the new dataset versus the
conceptualizations offered by Powell and Thyne.
2.2 Military Coup D’état
The conceptualization of the military coup d’état in the dataset is partially similar
to the conceptualization of a coup d’état offered by Powell and Thyne in the sense
that it is the instance of an illegal ouster of the chief executives. However, the new
dataset conditioned that the coup instance must be plotted by at least one military
actor. This condition was a necessity to differentiate military coups from other coup
types. By extension, coups that were purely instigated by civilian or non-military
actors were excluded. On the other hand, this exclusion does not mean that civilian or
non-military coups are not as important as coups instigated by military actors. But this
exclusion was applied to avoid conflating a military coup d’états with other coup
types such as a paramilitary coup, police coup or palace coup. The exclusion was
possible through analyzing the coup plotters’ agency in the 77 instances of successful
coup d’état from the year 1980-2013. Due to this exclusion, the number of cases
decreased from 77 instances of successful coup d’état to 68 instances of successful
military coup d’état. One of the excluded cases was the case of Qatar in 1995. The
former Emir of Qatar Prince Hamed Bin Khalifa, deposed his father in 1995 in what
was commonly considered as a palace coup. It was a coup evaluated, coordinated and
executed by a royal family member with no records of any military intervention in the
coup process. Emir Hamed took the advantage of his father’s visit to Genera in July
1995, and made a speech on the national T.V. that some circumstances forced him “to
take the reins of power in the country”. 66The Qatari case was excluded due to the
absence of the military coup agency regardless of the coup type. Another example is
the successful coup instance of Lesotho in 1986. The coup was instigated by Major
General Justin Lekhanya who ousted President Leabua Jonathan.67 By the year 1986,
Lesotho did not possess any regular military institution, and its security was
dependent on its paramilitary force that was led by Major General Lekhanya at that
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time.68 This case was excluded due to the same reason for excluding the Qatari case
that is absence of the military interference and coup agency, however the absence is in
this case is due to the absence of a military institution.
2.3 Successful Military Coup
The conceptualization of the successful instance of military coup is similar to the
conceptualization of the successful instance of coup by Powell and Thyne. The
success/failure is conceptualized empirically; if the coup plotters were in a position to
oust their predecessors and sustain the survival of their post-coup regime for 7 days,
then the coup instance is a success. This empirical conceptualization helps in avoiding
arbitrary qualitative understandings of coup success or failure. Limiting the new
dataset to the successful instances of military coup d’état is a major limitation,
however it was justified due to the availability of information on the coup agency at
moments of successful military coup in comparison to moments of unsuccessful
military coups.
2.4 Plotter/Coordinator
The new dataset adopted a partial conceptualizing of the coup plotter/coordinator
offered by Powell and Thyne, that the plotter should be a part of the state apparatus in
order not to conflate coups d’état with other actions such as civil wars and
revolutions. However, the new dataset conditioned that there must be at least one
military coup plotter among the coup plotters. This limitation does not ignore or
reduce the importance of civilian or non-military coup plotters, yet it only considers
them when there is a military interference in any of the coup processes as a means of
understanding the “military coup agency”.
2.5 Service Branches
The service branches were classified into the universal service branches of the
armed forces such as Ground Force, Navy and Air Force. In addition, the new dataset
identified other semi-military service branches such as the paramilitary forces or
coercive state apparatus such as the law enforcement forces.
2.6 Coordination Level
The new dataset offered a categorization for the coup leader with regards to his
military job description as a means to measure the coup plotter’s/plotters’ sphere of
influence as discussed in the previous chapter and its effect on coup type formation.
2.6.1 Coordinators from the Top
This category included only military coup leaders as Ministers of Defense or Joint
Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces. It was assumed in the previous chapter that only
those who held these two posts have the highest levels of influence within the armed
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forces. This conceptualization had two advantages. First, it allows separating the two
most influential posts in the armed forces that enable its holder the ability to liaise
between different service branches, from other influential posts with less influence
such as a service branch commander. Second, the new dataset avoided a hierarchal
categorization that is dependent on the military rank; this is due to differences in
universal military ranking. For instance, scholars such as Singh suggested that
categorization could be done through categorizing the military ranks. Now let us
consider, as Singh considered, plotters from the top as those senior officers who have
the rank above the rank of a colonel.69 This would make any plotter with the rank of a
colonel or below a colonel a plotter from the middle or the bottom. Now let me apply
this conceptualization to the coup case of Mauritania in 1980. The Mauritanian
military institution did not offer any rank above the rank of a colonel before 2011.70
In 1980, the colonel’s rank was the highest military rank known in Mauritania. It was
the minister of defense, Colonel Mohamed Haudallah who ousted El-Louly’s
regime.71 If we applied a rank categorization to the case studies, then the case of
Mauritania in 1980 would be coded as a case coordinated by a plotter of a middle
rank, even though the coordinator in this case lies on the top of the military
institution. Henceforth, the new dataset opted for a job description categorization such
as the minister of defense or the chief of staff regardless of the plotter’s rank.
2.6.2 Coordinators from the Middle and Bottom
This category conceptualizes military coup coordinators who are not either
Ministers of Defense or Joint Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces. This category as
discussed in chapter 2 is less likely to be capable of liaising between different service
branches. Yet, these coordinators possess more hard power than their counterparts
from the top due to their direct contact with their fighting battalions. Both
coordinators from the middle and the bottom were combined in one category as they
share a restricted influence within the armed forces if compared to their counterparts
from the top.
2.7 Social Unrest
The new dataset conceptualized social unrest as a moment triggered by a
combination of deteriorating living standards such as income inequalities, economic
backwardness, lack of political freedoms, alienation of certain segments within the
society from certain rights and the lack of political accountability and
representation.72 These reasons can instigate general resentment that is channeled into
an intensified contagion effect. This contagion is facilitated by the shared resentment
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among society members and is translated from a personal resentment into a shared
popular resentment. A spark might trigger this general grievance and transform it into
a social rebellion such as a sudden death of an authoritarian incumbent who left
behind a power gap, civil war, or minor incidents such as transformed into a catalyst
for a wider scale rebellion such as the incident of Bou-Azizi in Tunisia. This
conceptualization has two advantages. First, it encapsulates different factors that were
discussed as preconditions of coups d’état by scholars such as Samuel Huntington and
Luttwack. Second, this conceptualization avoids conflating coup instances preceded
by social unrest with coup instances preceded by a relative political and social
stability. The new dataset coded the moments of social unrest that preceded the coup
instance, regardless of the coup type, through investigating the presence of any form
of social unrest mentioned above on the condition that this form of social unrest lies
within a timeframe of at least one year prior to the coup instance.
2.8 Instances of Mixed Coups
Instances of mixed coups were conceptualized as the coup instances that were
plotted by a heterogeneous composition of military coup plotters who have different
service branches. In case the composition of the military coup plotters included at
least one plotter from a different service branch, then the coup plotters’ composition
is heterogeneous and by extension the coup is coded as a mixed coup.
2.9 Instances of Infantry Coups
Instances of infantry coups were conceptualized as the coup instances that were
plotted by an exclusive composition of military coup plotter whose service branch is
only related to the ground forces. In case the composition of the ground forces coup
plotter did not include any plotters from other service branches, then the coup is
coded as an infantry coup.
3. Dataset Overview
The data analysis covers 68 successful instances of coup d’état. 24 of which are
successful instances of mixed coups and 44 cases are infantry coups. 68 cases were
not restricted to certain geographic regions. The geographical distribution of the
sample is as follows:
The!Geographical!Distrubtion!of!Successful!Military!Coup!Instances!from!1980I2013!
Europe!

0!

North!America!

0!

Latin!America!
Asia!
Africa!

!

10!
11!
47!
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47 cases took place in Africa, 10 cases in Latin America and 11 cases in Asia. In
addition, the dataset noticed no successful military coup instance in both North
America and Europe from 1980-2013.
3.1 Coup Agency
The coup plotters’ agency covers different service branches within the armed
forces, law enforcement forces and paramilitary. The average percentage of coup
plotters with regards to their affiliated service branches could be illustrated in the
following diagram

Coup%Plotter%Agency%for%Successful%
Instances%of%Military%Coup%D'état%From%
1980@2013%%
Ground!Forces!

Navy!
3.9%!

Air!Force!
4.2%!

Paramilitary!Forces! Police!
0.1%!
1.6%!

90.2%!

90.2% is the average percentage of the ground forces’ coup plotters in the
successful instances of military coup d’état from 1980-2013. On the other hand, an
average of 4.2% of coup plotters belonged to the air force. The navy coup plotters
marked an average of 3.9%. As for the paramilitary forces’ coup plotters, they scored
an average of 1.6%. The coup plotters who came from the ranks of the law
enforcement forces, police, scored an average 0.1%.
Only one service branch was able to score a 100% of coup plotters in some of the
cases, this service branch was the ground forces, and these cases were coded as
infantry coups. This analysis entails two hypotheses; first, ground forces are able to
execute successful military coups d’états independently without involving other
officers from other service branches. Second, other service branches such as air force
and navy are less likely to execute successful military coups without the assistance of
the ground forces. The above diagram showed an overall percentage of coup plotters
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agency across service branches; however, the analysis of the main coup leader, the
head of the coup plotters, showed a different percentage.

Coup%Leader's%AfEliation%
Ground!Forces!

Navy!

Paramilitary!

Air!Force!

Police!

1.5%!

98.5%!

98.5% of the coup leaders were affiliated with ground forces in successful
instances of military coup d’états; whereas only 1.5% was affiliated with the navy.
The 1.5% represents the two cases of the island of Fiji in 2006 and 2000. The two
coups were evaluated, coordinated and executed by the same military personnel
admiral Frank Bainimarama.73 It is remarkable to notice that no coup leader came
from the ranks of the air force, navy, police or paramilitary in these successful
instances of military coup d’état. An explanation to this note could lie in the inability
of these service branches to fulfill the requirements of executing a coup efficiently as
coup plotters from the ground forces. This efficiency has all long been a product of
the military capability in terms of equipment and special training for each specific
branch to accomplish certain objectives. How about the 1.5% scored by Navy? The
explanation for the 1.5% scored by the Navy was due to the military post of the Fijian
coup leader before the coup. Admiral Commodore Frank Bainimarama was appointed
as the overall commander of the Fijian armed forces before the 2000 coup. This
means that Admiral Commodore Bainimarama, regardless of his service branch,
Navy, assumed control over the whole armed forces as a general commander.
As illustrated in the case of Fiji, the military post assumed by the coup leader could
indicate his control over other service branches regardless of his primary service
branch. This urged a need to analyze the coordination hierarchy in the dataset:
whether coordination from the top, or coordination from the middle or bottom. The
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categorization of the main coup plotter status with regards to the 68 cases analyzed by
the dataset could be illustrated as follows:
Coordinator!Status!

From!the!Middle/Bottom!

39!

From!the!Top!

29!

Coordinator%Status%
Coordinator!From!Top!

Coordinator!From!the!Middle/Bottom!

42.6%!
57.4%!

Across the 68 cases analyzed by the dataset, 42.6% of the cases, 29 cases, we
coordinated by either the Joint Chief of Staff or the Minister of Defense. On the other
hand, 57.4% of the cases, 39 cases, were coordinated by military personnel who
ranged from service branches’ commanders to non-commissioned officers and
soldiers. The difference in both percentages was not sufficient to mark a correlation
between successful coups and coordination hierarchy.
3.2 Coup Status
Instances of coups d’états were labeled by many scholars such as Luttwak,
Huntington, and Derek Lutterbeck as a product of some preconditions such as
!
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economic backwardness, political instability, authoritarian mode of governance, and
other forms that can catalyze social unrest.74 As a result it was crucial for the new
dataset to check if there is a correlation between social unrest and the 68 cases.

Coup%Status%
Social!Unrest!

No!Social!Unrest!

36.8%!
63.2%!

63.2% of 68 cases were preceded by social unrest. On the contrary, only 36.8%
were not preceded by any form of social unrest.
3.3 Coup Type
Military coups were classified in this dataset into mixed coups and infantry coups
as discussed above. The categorization of the coup types could be illustrated in the
following diagram:

Coup%Type%
Mixed!Coup!

Infantry!Coup!

35.3%!
64.7%!

64.7% of the cases are infantry coups with a number of 44 cases. Whereas mixed
coup scored a 35.3% percent of the coup cases with a number of 24 cases.
4. Data analysis
Some assumptions were discussed theoretically in chapter two with regards to the
influence of social unrest on the coordination class and by extension its impact on the
coup type. These assumptions were crystallized in 4 hypotheses in the previous
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chapter. This section would test the validity of the 4 theoretical hypotheses
empirically through the successful military coup agency dataset from 1980-2013.
4.1 Coup Status and Coordinator Class
Social unrest moments are moments of general grievance or defiance against the
regime that might be caused due to various reasons. The variation of these reasons is
not the core of this dissertation, yet what this dissertation is interested in is the
absence or the presence of social unrest before the coup. In the previous chapter, I
assumed that it is more likely for coordinators from the top to coordinate a coup at
moments of social unrest (regardless of the coup type).
In order to check these two aspects, I generated a simple cross tabulation between
coup status (whether the coup is preceded by social unrest or not preceded by any of
the forms of the social unrest) and coordination class (whether the coordinator is from
the top as the Minister of Defense /Joint Chief of Staff or from the bottom/middle to
represent the rest of the military institution). The H0, null hypothesis, for this cross
tabulation is that coup status is not associated with the coup coordinator class.
Whereas the H1, the alternative hypothesis would assume that there is an association
between the two variables:

•
•

!

H0: There is no association between coup status and coordinator’s class
H1: There is an association between coup status and coordinator’s class
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92%!
No!Social!Unrest!
8%!

37.20%!
Social!Unrest!
62.80%!
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!

Coordinator!From!the!Top!
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62.8% of the coups preceded by social unrest, regardless of the coup type, were
evaluated, coordinated and executed from the top. On the contrary, when the coup
was not preceded by social unrest, the percentage of coordinators decreased by 54.8%
(62.8% - 8%). As for coups coordinated from middle/bottom, it jumped to 92% in the
absence of social unrest and decreased by 54.8% in the presence of social unrest.
The Chi-Square test, x2, is used here to measure the significance degree of
associating the two variables. x2 scored a value of 19.403 with a degree of freedom
=1. The P-Value scored 0.0001, which explains a significant relation between the
coup status and coordinator’s class knowing that the P value is < 0.05. Testing the
strength of a correlation between coup status and coordination class through Cramer’s
Phi resulted in the presence of a significant correlation between the coup status and
coordination class with a value of 0.534 on a scale from 0 to 1.
Empirically, these results rejected H0 and validated H1. There was a significant
association between the coup status and the coups coordination level. There is an
explanation behind these numbers, and its answer lies in the efficiency of the coup
plotters to execute coups at moments of social unrest. The remarkable variation of
percentages represents the efficiency of some coordinators to make use of these
moments of social unrest due to their ability to evaluate and coordinate faster than in
comparison to other coordinators.
Taking into consideration that both types of coordinators are able to coordinate at
moments of social unrest; the answer would be coordinators from the top and this
explains the 62.8% of coups coordinated from the top at moments of social unrest.
Coordinators from the top can acquire sufficient information due to their military
posts that enable them to efficiently evaluate, coordinate and execute spontaneously.
On the other hand, coordinators from the middle/bottom would have needed longer
time to evaluate and coordinate for the coup execution due to the restrictions they face
while acquiring information or summoning potential coup plotters to coordination
meetings in addition to potential resistance from the top at the moment of execution.
These limitations could be faced by longer time intervals, which by extension enable
!
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the coordinators from the middle/bottom to plan their moves efficiently. These
limitations have indeed decreased the odds of coordinators from the middle/bottom to
execute coups at moments of social unrest, as they scored 37.2% in comparison to
62.8% for coordinators from the top.
It is crucial to remark two points. First, these percentages do not question the
ability of coordinators from bottom/middle to execute successful coups at moments of
social unrest. Yet, it questioned the probability (whether it was more likely or less
likely) of specific coordinators class to execute coups at moments of social unrest in a
limited time frame from 1980-2013. Second, this study does not show those moments
of social unrest influenced coup plotters, regardless of their military status, to initiate
coups. However, this study analyzed the reason behind the differences in coordination
level of coup instances that already took place at moments of social unrest.
4.2 Coup Type and Coup Status
In the previous chapter, it was assumed that social unrest could be utilized by coup
coordinators to convince coup plotters from different service branches on the
condition that the main coup plotter has the ability to liaise between them. In this
section, I shall assume the presence social unrest influenced the coup type (Infantry or
Mixed Coups). In order to check any association between the two variables a simple
cross tabulation is generated. I will assume H0 that there is no association between the
two aspects. On the contrary, the alternative hypothesis would assume that there is an
association between the two variables.
•
•
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The cross tabulation entailed that 55.8% of the successful coups preceded by social
unrest were mixed coup, between 1980 and 2013. On the contrary, when social unrest
was not present no mixed coup took place. Whereas 44.2% of infantry coups were
preceded by social unrest, and when it did not exist, this percentage jumped to reach a
100%. Testing the strength of a correlation between coup status and coordination
class through Cramer’s Phi resulted in the presence of a significant correlation
between the coup status and coup type with a value of 0.563 on a scale from 0 to 1.
The Chi-Square, X2, is used here to assess the significance of associating coup
status to coup type. It scored a value of 21.564 with a degree of freedom=1. The PValue score 0.00001 and this entails a significant association between the two
variables knowing that P < 0.05.
These empirical results rejected H0 and validated H1 stating that there is a
significant association between the pre-coup status and coup type. 55.8% of the coups
preceded by social unrest were mixed coups, and 100% of these mixed coups took
place at moments of social unrest. I assume that the presence of social unrest
represents a persuasive tool that could be used by the coup coordinators to influence
potential coup plotters from different service branch to join the coup as a means to
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end the state of social unrest on condition that the coordinator is capable of liaising
between these different service branches. In the previous chapter, I assumed that
coordinators from the top could easily fulfill the requirement of leasing between
different service branches due to their commanding posts as general commanders of
the armed forces. Due to this assumption, I have performed a controlled cross
tabulation, where I have controlled the presence of social unrest and excluded all the
cases that were not preceded by social unrest. This test could show the association of
coordination levels and coup types specifically at moments of social unrest to give an
understanding to the occurrence of mixed coups only at specific moments of social
unrest.
•
•

!

H0: There is no association between coordination level and coup type at
moments of social unrest.
H1: There is an association between coordination level and coup type at
moments of social unrest.
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The cross tabulation included 100% of the mixed coup instances and 56.8% of the
infantry coup as these were the only instances that were preceded by social unrest. 21,
87.5%, out of 24 mixed coup instances were coordinated from the top, whereas 3,
12.5%, out 24 mixed coup instances were coordinated from the middle/bottom. On
the contrary, infantry coups that were preceded by social unrest were mostly
coordinated by coordinators from the middle/bottom with a percentage of 68.4%.
The Chi-Square, X2, scored a value of 14.194 with a degree of freedom=1. The PValue score 0.00001 and this entails a significant association between the two
variables knowing that P < 0.05. Testing the strength of a correlation between
coordination class and coup type through Cramer’s Phi resulted in the presence of a
significant correlation between the coup status and coup type with a value of 0.575 on
a scale from 0 to 1.
This result rejects the null hypothesis and validates a significant relation between
coordination class and coup type at moments of social unrest. These results showed
how coordinators from the top were more likely to use social unrest as a persuasive
reason to tempt potential coup plotters from different service branch. The odds for
the coordinators from the top were higher than their counterparts from the
middle/bottom as the later were only able to execute 3 out 24 mixed coups in
comparison to the former who executed 21 out 24 mixed coups. I assume that the
reason behind this variation is contributed to the capabilities of the coordinators to
influence other service branches. In other words, because the network of the
coordinators from the top exceeds a specific service branch, they had more chances in
coordinating with different service branches, On the other hand, because of the
limited network of coordinators from the middle/ bottom; they mainly recruited whom
they can contact, even at moment of social unrest.
As for the infantry coups that took place at moments of social unrest, they were
more likely to be coordinated from the middle/bottom as coordinators from the
middle/bottom coordinated 68.4% of the infantry coups preceded by social unrest.
The explanation for this likelihood lies in the limited network of these coordinators to
liaise between different service branches in comparison to their superiors from the
top. These coordinators would use their hard power through their direct contact with
their fighting battalions and operate quickly at moments of social unrest before losing
longer time to contact other service branches knowing of their limited chances to
contact them.
It is worthy to mention that at moments of no social unrest, only infantry coups
were executed. In the following cross tabulation, I have excluded all the cases that
were preceded by moments of the social unrest and its results was as follows:
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0%!
Mixed!Coups!At!Moments!of!No!Social!Unrest!
0%!
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8%!

Coordinator!From!the!Top!

The reasons behind infantry coups at moments of no social unrest could be infinite.
Some could be related to a personal grievance of a certain military general due to the
survival of a certain business as the case in Bolivia in 1980.75 Other infantry coups
were executed because of the refusal of a general to be dismissed from the military

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75!Peter!McFarren!and!Fabrique!Iglesias,!The!Devil’s!Agent!(Bloomington:!Xlibris!

Corporation,!2013),!309.!
!

44!

service as the case with Pervez Musharaf in Pakistan in 1999,76 and so on. However,
the only shared aspect that infantry coups had at moments of no social unrest was the
absence of general grievance such as social unrest that could persuade different
officers from different service branch to join a risky illegal act such as a coup.
5. Conclusion
This chapter analyzed the dataset of coup agency. The analysis validated the
following assumptions with regards to the successful instances of military coup
d’états within a specific period from 1980 till 2013.
•

•

•
•
•
•

Plotters from the ground forces were able to execute successful military coups
d’états independently without involving other officers from other service
branches.
Plotters from the other regular service branches of the armed forces, air force
and navy, were not able to execute a successful coup independently without the
engagement of the ground forces.
Coups preceded by social unrest were more likely to be coordinated from the top
Coordinators from the top were more likely to coordinate mixed coups at
moments of social unrest.
Coordinators from the middle/bottom were more likely to coordinate infantry
coups regardless of the coup status.
Coup coordinators were more likely to coordinate infantry coups at moments of
no social unrest.
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Chapter 4
Instances of Mixed Military Coups D’état: Thailand 1991 and
Turkey 1980
55.8% of the successful instances of military coup d’états at moments of social
unrest were mixed coups. The interesting fact is that all the instances of mixed coups
from 1980-2013 were preceded by social unrest. This does not mean that social unrest
causes instances of mixed coups, as still some infantry coups were preceded by
moments of social unrest, and even some moments of social unrest were not followed
by a military coup. However, moments of social unrest preceded all the mixed coup
instances from 1980-2013. One had to apply a deeper analysis to find the missing link
that specifically links social unrest to coup agency formation. I approached this
missing link through looking into the coordination level. In other words, who within
the military can efficiently utilize the instant common knowledge resulted from
moments of social unrest and can simultaneously influence the coup agency
formation? The answer was coordinators from the top, as these coordinators are the
general commanders of the armed forces, and this enabled them to evaluate efficiently
and spontaneously at moments of social unrest. In addition, their commanding post
allowed them to liaise between different branches smoothly in comparison to their
counterparts from the middle/bottom. I argued in Chapter 2 that although coordinators
from the top are able to evaluate efficiently and liaise between service branches, this
does not mean that they can convince their subordinates to execute a risky
unconstitutional act such as a coup. Here comes the role of social unrest. Not only
does it imply a moment of weakness for the regime, it is also an asset that can be used
to convince potential coup plotters, in that case, from different service branches to
execute a coup to end social unrest. This chapter would analyze this chain reaction
starting with moments of social unrest till the instance of mixed coup through
studying the two mixed coups instances of Thailand in 1991 and Turkey in 1980.
1. Case A: Thailand 1991
• Coup Status:!Preceded by Social Unrest Due To
! Corruption Accusations to the Cabinet of Ministers
! Popular calls for the removal of the cabinet due to political and
administrative inefficiency
! Tense relation with the military institution after the resignation of
the minister of defense due to the inability of the cabinet to fight
corruption
• Execution Day:!23.02.1991
• Belligerents:
! Chatichai Choonhavan (Prime Minister)
! National Peace Keeping Council, NPKC (Military Junta).
• !Coup Type:!Mixed Coup
• !Coordination Type:!From the Top
! Coup coordinated by the Supreme Commander of The Armed
Forces that is equivalent to the Joint Chief of Staff.
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•

Result:
! The ouster of Chatichai and his cabinet
! The installment of the NPKC as a ruling military Junta

1.1 Prologue
The military has been a vital institution in Thailand since the late nineteenth
century and played a remarkable role in the political transformation of Thailand from
an absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy.77 Chatichai Choonhavan, a
former military general, became an elected prime minister after his predecessor
General Prem Tinsulanond stood down in August 1988. In his term as a Prime
Minister, Thailand enjoyed economic investment boom. 78 In addition, Chatichai
boosted his popularity through increasing governmental wages and enhancing the
Thai foreign relations with Indonesia. However, his era witnessed the rise of business
tycoons who started to manipulate the laws to serve their business interests. In
February 1991, the Thai military executed a mixed successful coup d’état as a
reaction to the popular demands that called for Chatichai’s resignation.
1.2 Pre-Coup Social Unrest
Chatichai depended on elite businessmen in order to bolster the economic growth
in Thailand. Economically, the results were promising in the sense of increasing
foreign investments and promoting a free-market economy system. However, this
economic growth targeted specific economic players who were at the same time
members of Chatichai’s Cabinet.79 These players were able to manipulate several
laws to eliminate their business competitors. For instance, the cabinet introduced,
discussed and later applied a law to ban logging forests to save the Thai forests from a
potential eradication. This law was operational, yet one lodging company, Suan Kitti,
owned by a senate and a minister, was permitted to operate in lands beyond its
granted concessions and protected whereas other many other logging firms were
handicapped by the very same law.80
In addition to these suspicious monopolies, Chatichai meant to manipulate the
political opposition parties through transferring cash sums to the executives of these
parties as a means of co-optation. Among those who received these bribes and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77

Bidhya Bowornwathana, “History and Political Context of Public Administration in
Thailand,” in Public Administration in Southeast Asia: Thailand, Philippines,
Malaysia, Hong Kong and Macao, edited by Evan Berman (New York: Taylor &
Francis, 2011), 35.
78
Frank Frost, “The Coup in Thailand: 23 February 1991: Background and
Implications,” Parliament of Australia, 1991, 6.
79
Ibid., 7.
80
Ibid., 8.
!

47!

became “unusually wealthy” during Chatichai’s era was Montri Ponpanich, the head
of the social action party.81 Also, Chatichai himself was known for accepting cash
sums from several business elites and international investors in order to safeguard
their thriving business in Thailand.82
Due to these accusations, Chatichai’s cabinet faced popular calls that demanded
clarifications on the cabinet’s suspicious policies. Chatichai and his cabinet preferred
to be indifferent rather than defending their policies, and ignored all these calls. Even
when the national Thai television hosted Chatichai and presented some of the popular
demands that called Chatichai to adopt anti-corruption policies, he replied with his
famous quote that corruption was “No Problem” in Thailand.83 The word “No
Problem” became a Political Cliché associated with Prime Minister Chatichai. Even
the Los Angeles Times took the liberty to give a title to Chatichai as the “No Problem
Prime Minister.”84 Chatichai’s indifferent answers only helped in transforming the
popular demands to end corruption into popular demands to oust the cabinet. A
sarcastic version of “No Problem” became the titled of a folk song by a Thai singer,
Aed Carabao, under the title of “No Plomplam”.85 Chatichai thought to safeguard his
cabinet and the business elites whom he incorporated in his cabinet instead of the
traditional military elite. He issued decree No. 42 that safeguarded the business elite
and his cabinet from societal pressure or parliamentary enquiries about corruption.86
Through this decree, Chatichai was able to ban newspapers from publishing any
reports on the cabinet’s corruption or the monopolies of the business elites.87
The unwillingness of Chatichai to end corruption was later transformed into calls
that asked the military institution to oust Chatichai’s cabinet; Chatichai tried to reduce
the public tense through appointing the popular supreme commander of the Thai
Armed Forces, Chawilt Yongchaiyudh, as a minister of defense.88 As a minister of
defense, Chawalit, tried to influence some reforms, yet he discovered that Chatichai
merely appointed him to turn down any military or public calls that demand the ouster
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of the government. Consequently, Chawalit preferred to resign rather than giving
further legitimacy to Chatichai.89
The resignation of Chawalit symbolized Chatichai’s inability to either dismiss the
corrupted officials in his cabinet or to apply reforms that would grant equal business
opportunities. The popular calls that had once called for Chatichai’s resignation
before Chawalit’s appointment were transformed into waves of demonstrations that
occupied the streets of Bangkok. Around 20 thousands protestors rallied in the streets
of Bangkok to show their willingness to oust Chatichai and even officially labeled
him as “The Parliamentary Dictator.”90 These protests were composed of: the lodging
workers who went out of business due to Chatichai’s concessions, university students
and newspapers syndicates who were not allowed to criticize Chatichai’s corrupted
cabinet due to decree 42, and the opposition parties that were mainly composed exmilitary members who were the traditional elites before being replaced by
businessmen.91 For a potential coup plotter, this state of social unrest represented a
perfect moment of fragility that could be evaluated for a coup’s coordination and
execution.
1.3 Evaluation
A self-conscious instant common knowledge prevailed due to the state of social
unrest in Thailand. This common knowledge was not generated by anyone, yet
perceived by everyone because of the nature of the situation of social unrest.
Everyone knew that everyone knew that Chatichai’s regime is at a moment of
weakness. Even members of Chatichai’s cabinet were aware of this weakness to the
extent that the Deputy Prime Minister Yubamarung Chaloem ordered a mobile radio
station to put under the command of the prime minister. He thought that this radio
station could help as a backup option to contact regime loyalists in case protestors or
the military tried to occupy any governmental structures or ousted the cabinet.92
General Sunthorn Kongsompong, the supreme commander of the Thai Armed Forces,
exploited this moment of weakness and demanded from the intelligence service to
submit reports on the social unrest in Thailand, and to predict the potential civilian
reaction in case the military ousted the cabinet. 93 Evaluating the potential civilian
reaction to a potential coup was quite instrumental for General Kongsompong to
ensure sufficient support for his coup plans. The reports came back with positive
results and recommended that the military high command should be prepared at any
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moment to oust the cabinet; otherwise, the protestors might resort to violent means to
oust the cabinet.94
1.4 Coordination
As a supreme commander, General Kongsompon did not possess any hard power
to execute a coup due to his indirect contact with the fighting battalions. General
Kongsompon summoned the service branches commanders to a meeting to present his
coup plans to them on the 21st of November 1990. This meeting was camouflaged
under the title of “The Dignity of the Soldiers” to show sympathy for ex-minister of
defense Chawalit who preferred to resign rather than giving legitimacy to a corrupted
cabinet. In this meeting, General Kongsompong utilized the state of social unrest to
convince the commanders of the service branch of the necessity of a military reaction
to the political developments in Thailand. He presented to them the reports submitted
by the intelligence about the precarious future that Thailand might face in case the
military did not intervene.95 None of those who attended the meeting objected to the
supreme commander’s plans. Two days later, on the 23rd of November, the military
radio announced that the military institution with all its service branches had lost
confidence in the prime minister and his cabinet.96 After this announcement, some
intelligence reports were delivered to the supreme commander about the intension of
the prime minister to dismiss him and the ground forces commander after securing the
consent of the king in February 1991.97 For the supreme commander, the main
coordinator, and his coup plotters, everything was set for the moment of execution,
and they all agreed to execute before Chatichai meet the king.
1.5 Execution
On the 23rd of February 1991, Chatichai was willing to fly to Chiengmai to secure
the king’s consent over several issues that included the appointment of a new minister
of defense, Arthit Kamlangek, and the dismissal of both the supreme commander of
the armed forced and the ground forces commander.98 General Kongsompong knew
that if Chatichai was able to meet the king, then he would lose his authority and a
loyalist supreme commander would have been put in his place. Therefore, he decided
that Chatichai should not be allowed to fly to Chiengmai. The execution plan was
dependent on the simultaneous move of the coup plotters forces. Before Prime
Minister Chatichai and his minister of defense took off to Chiengmai, air force
officers put them under arrest.99 At the same moment, members of the 1st Ground
Forces Division and an Anti-Aircraft, AA, Artillery Division secured the mobile radio
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station obtained by Minister Chaloem to prohibit the cabinet from any external
contacts.100 Also, these divisions occupied airports, roads, the Parliament, TV, radio
stations and other symbolic structures. As for the role of the supreme commander, he
headed to the radio to announce the military take over and the ouster of the Prime
Minister.101
1.6 Making A Fact
The process of “Making a fact” is about addressing the people of what happened
and who is in charge from the moment of execution onwards. Theoretically, coup
plotters, after taking control over strategic structures, are not afraid of the ousted
cabinet such as the Prime Minister or his cabinet, as these people possess no arms and
they are already under arrest. However, the plotters would be afraid of any potential
militant resistance by any militant loyalist. That is why plotters tend, in the “making a
fact” process to state that any resistance would be minimal and severely punishable.
The supreme commander, while his forces were taking over the prime minister, his
cabinet and the strategic structures, he went to the radio to announce the coup success
to generate common knowledge of who is in charge. Furthermore, he announced that
the state of marshal law was activated; which meant that any resistance to the coup
forces would have been dealt with severely using fatal means.
In his speech, General Kongsompong declared the following points:102
Reasons behind the coup
! Attempt of creating a parliamentary dictatorship
! Severe Corruption
! Harassment of Honest Civil Servants
! Governmental Attempts to disrupt military unit
! Compromising the police investigation of the 1982 assassination
plot of politicians.
• Marshal Laws:
! Public Assemblies Were Subject To Prohibition (to limit any
potential resistance)
! Press Censorship
• The Abolishment of the Constitution
• The Abolishment of the Parliament
• The Formation a the National Peace Keeping Council, NPKC
•

The NPKC was the title of the military junta that took over the political
administration after the coup. The junta was also named as the Five-General Junta. It
included the coup leaders under the command of the supreme commander of the
armed forces.
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1.6.1 The Formation of the NPKC:103
•
•
•
•
•

General Sunthorn Kongsompon, The Supreme Commander of the Thai
Armed and the Chairman of the NPKC
General Suchinda Kraprayoon, The Ground Forces Commander
General Kaset Rojananil, The Air Force Commander
General Prapat Krisnachan, The Navy Commander
General Issarapong Noonpakdi, The Deputy Ground Forces Commander

On the 24th of February, one day after the coup, the NPKC announced that an
interim civilian government would soon be appointment, whereas the NPKC would
only take an advisory role. 104 Frank Frost, a political advisor to the Australian
Parliament who was assigned to investigate the 1991 coup in Thailand, argued that
the NPKC took this step in order to stabilize their role and to give a civilian
legitimacy to their military form of governance. 105 This frame included the
appointment of respected technocrats, former highly esteemed bureaucrats and
businessmen.
It is noteworthy to highlight the differences between republics and constitutional
monarchies at this point. The above steps that lead to the “making a fact” process are
quite valid in republics, yet to apply them into constitutional monarchies we will have
to add a further point that is the approval of the king. This is why one day after the
coup, General Kongsompong, knew that the king’s endorsement is necessary,
otherwise, he might face the same failure of the 1981 and 1985 coups d’état.106
Henceforth, he travelled to Chiengmai and on the same day, a royal command was
issued to endorse the coup as a legitimate move by the army against a corrupted
government that was not up to the people’s expectation.107 From this point, the
plotters stabilized their role, and a successful mixed coup was executed.
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2. Case B: Turkey 1980
• Coup Status:!Preceded by Social Unrest Due To
! The multiple failures of political actors to either form a majority
government or a coalition government
! The mass killings of thousands by radical political actors
! Mass prison breaks
! High inflation rates
! Lack of security
• Execution Day:!12.09.1980
• Belligerents:
! Sulieman Demierel (Prime Minister)
! National Security Council, NSC (Military Junta).
• !Coup Type:!Mixed Coup
• !Coordination Type:!From the Top
! Coup coordinated by the Joint Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed
Forces: General Kenan Evren
• Result:
! The ouster of Sulieman Demierel’s cabinet
! The installment of the NSC as a ruling Military Junta
2.1 Prologue
The emblem of the Turkish army is designed as a shield with a picture of Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the republic in the early twentieth century. Military
emblems usually stand for the values and the ideologies military institutions endorse.
The ideologies and the values of Turkish army could also be explained in the same
terms. The Turkish military regarded itself as a guardian. Yet this guardian is not only
guarding the state, it is guarding the values and ideologies of Ataturk, as well. In other
words, whenever the Turkish military noticed a deviant political behavior that shifted
away from the models drafted by Ataturk, it intervened to bring it back to its original
track. This guardian model was not just limited to emblems; it was also incorporated
in several Turkish Constitutions such as article (35) from the Turkish constitution of
1961. According to this article, the military is authorized to oust any elected
government if the military perceived that this government is violating the Turkish
constitution that safeguards the Kemalist values.108 Through the means of this article,
the Turkish military ousted ended the parliamentary democracy in 1980 and installed
instead a military junta under the name of the National Security Council, NSC.
2.2 Pre-coup Social Unrest
Turkey started witnessing consequent weak governments following the 1973
elections. No party was able to secure two-thirds of the parliament either by gaining
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the sufficient number of seats or forming coalitions.109 This fragmentation led to the
formation of short-life governments that are incapable of obtaining enough votes to
pursue any necessary social or economic political agendas.110 The June 1977 elections
failed to generate one-single party cabinet, and the only resort was to form fragile
coalition governments that also were incapable of pursuing any legislations. 111
Thousands of demonstrations were led by rightists and leftists to represent their
powers on the streets. These demonstrations eventually turned into street fights and
resulted in the death of hundreds.112 Social grievance was the only aspect shared by
the Turkish people due to the political and economic stagnation of Turkey. Political
polarization and terrorism became a tool of political participation. In the opening day
of the Middle East Technical University, students who were affiliated with the
Communist Party refused to sing the Turkish anthem and sung instead The
Communist International.113As for the economic situation, the value of the Turkish
Lira fell from $1= 25 Lira in 1978 to $1=78 Lira in 1980, and the real growth rate of
the GNP reached 0% in 1979.114
Political terrorism became more sophisticated and selective with regards to
targeting victims. The right wing formed a terrorist group under the name of the
Turkish Revenge Brigade and targeted leftist politicians such as the labor leader
Kemal Turkler. 115 As for the left wing, they formed the DEV-SOL or The
Revolutionary Front and assassinated the deputy chairmen of the National Action
Party Gun Gazak.116 The same terrorist group DEV-SOL killed later the moderate
former Prime Minister Nihat Erim and left a note which reads “We have punished
Gun Sazak. We are now Punishing Nihat Erim.”117 Political parties continued their
infighting and contributed to a further public factionalism. Even the police forces
were influenced by this factionalism and allowed the prison breaks of those whom
they share with the same political ideology whether this ideology was to the right or
the left. 118 In less than 22 months, more than 3000 prisoners escaped or were
“escaped” by these police officers.119 Simultaneously, these parties accused each
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other of terrorism rather than uniting to form a coalition government to snatch the
country out of its political, social and economic turmoil. Consequently, the Turkish
political arena became no longer an arena of political contestation, yet an arena of
targeted physical elimination among those who did not share the same political
ideology.
2.3 Evaluation
General Kenan Evren, the Joint Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, who
was appointed in 1978 was analyzing the political situation carefully to plan whether
the military institution should get itself involved or not. This careful evaluation was
contributed to two reasons. First, General Evren’s determination to delay any
intervention until it was seemed to be no other options but to intervene, as only at this
moment, according to Evren, the legitimacy of the intervention would not be
questioned.120 Second, General Evren was aware of the polarized political situation,
he thought that an instant uncalculated military intervention, at the onset of the social
unrest in 1978 might have had a backfire effect that unites the civilian political parties
against the military. General Evren utilized the instant common knowledge of social
unrest so that everyone, civilian and military, knows that the regime is weak and is
incapable to pursue any social, political or economic policies that could end the
turmoil. By extension, he waited for the level of social grievance to increase and for
the people to lose hope in the politicians and welcome a military intervention. During
these two years, 1978-1980, General Evren gathered sufficient intelligence to evaluate
the moment of social unrest. In 1979, General Evren asked General Haydar Saltik
from the intelligence to write a report on the political situation in turkey, and to
recommend if this situation would require a simple warning from the military
institution to the government or a military coup.121 Six months later, the report came
up and suggested that military intervention is inevitable and should not be delayed;
otherwise, the country would be heading steadily towards civil war. 122 At this
moment, General Evren’s evaluation was over, and started the coordination process
with his potential coup associates.
2.4 Coordination
General Evren, as the Joint Chief of Staff and the General Commander of the
Turkish Armed Forces, same as General Kongsompong from Thailand, did not posses
hard power under his command due to his indirect contact with the fighting battalions.
Therefore, it was essential for him to coordinate with those who possess this hard
power such as the service branches commanders if the coup was to succeed. He used
his authority as the General Commander of the Armed Forces to summon the
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Commanders of the Turkish Armed Forces’ service branches to an urgent meeting in
the military academy by the 27th of December 1979.123 Evren utilized the state of
social unrest to persuade the service branches’ commanders of the necessity of a
military action. He started the meeting showing them the report written by General
Saltik of the precarious future scenarios that might happen if the military was not to
intervene. The commanders read the report, yet were hesitant not to imply an instant
reaction to the report by supporting General Evren. This reaction proves that even the
General Commander of the Armed Forces, regardless of his extensive influence,
might fail to convince his subordinates to execute a risky unconstitutional act such as
a coup. Instead of approving General Evren’s plans, the Commanders voted on giving
the political parties a final chance through sending a warning letter to the heads of the
two major political parties, Justice Party under the command of Demeriel and the
Republican People’s Party under the command Mustafa Ecevit. The letter, entitled
“The Opinion of the Turkish Armed Forces”, warned these two leaders that the
“division created by the political parties caused anarchy and secessionism and
discrimination among the police, teachers and many other establishment
…………The Turkish Armed Force, fully conscious of its duties, hereby persistently
demand all our political parities to unite in the direction of the constitution and
Kemalism.”124 The Joint Chief of Staff and the commanders of each of the service
branches signed the letter. Simultaneously, Kenan Evren suggested that a second
report should be written to check the impact of the warning letter over the course of
the political action. The second report was submitted in March 1980 and stated that
the political infighting did not stop. The report recommended a coup without any
further delays. 125 By that moment, the Commanders of the service branches were
quite convinced by General Evren’s coup plans and regarded these plans as a solution
to end the political turmoil. After a 2nd meeting, the coordination process was over,
and the coup plotters waited for the execution moment.
2.5 Execution
In March’s 2nd meeting, the coup plotters planned to execute the coup on the 11th
of July.126 However, they decided to abort this plan as they noticed some trials within
the parliament that might restore peace and order if Demierel’s government was able
to secure a vote of confidence. On the 2nd of July, the vote of confidence was
rejected.127 On the 26th of August, Evren summoned the commanders again to propose
an alternative date for execution, and he proposed that the coup would be executed
after the conclusion of the Turkish-American Defense Cooperation Agreement on the
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10th of September 1980. 128 At 23:00 on the 11th of September, Evren and the
commanders headed for their commanding posts one hour before the zero hour of
execution: 00:00. The black sedans of the Joint Chief of Staff and the Commanders of
the service branches were reported to have been seen moving through the streets of
Ankara carrying these commanders to their headquarters. 129 At 00:00 tanks and
armored personal carriers, APCs, occupied the streets of the capital. These fighting
battalions took over all communications including the broadcasting stations of T.V
and Radio. Simultaneously, other battalions took over the transportation facilities
such as airports, navy ports and railway stations all over Turkey.130 At 3:15, fighting
battalions surrounded several party leaders’ houses including the house of the former
Prime Minister Ecevit.131
2.6 Making A Fact
General Evren concluded his coup through the “Making a Fact” process. This process
included the declaration of the coup leader the motives behind the coup as well as the
future procedures that would be applied. At 4:15, General Evren reached the main
radio station in Ankara and began his broadcast of the events that led to the coup. He
said, “ Citizens even in the most remote corners of the country become the targets of
attacks and suppression and pushed into the threshold of civil war. The Turkish
Armed Forces took the decision to fulfill its duty of protecting and safeguarding the
Turkish Republic as laid down in its internal service code.” 132 Later on, Evren
declared the following decisions:133
•
•
•
•

The ouster of the government under the leadership of Sulieman Demierel
The suspension of the Parliament
The proclamation of marshal law and curfew throughout the whole
republic (to terminate any potential resistance to the coup plotters’ forces)
The Formation of the National Security Council, NSC.

The NSC was the title of the military junta that took over the political
administration after the coup. The junta was also named as the Five-General Junta. It
included the coup leaders under the command of the Joint Chief of Staff of the armed
forces.
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2.6.1 The Formation of the NSC:134
•
•
•
•
•

General Kenan Evren, the Joint Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces
and the chief of the NSC.
General Nurettin Ersin, the commander of the Turkish Ground Forces
General Tahsin Sahinkaya, the commander of the Turkish Air Force
Admiral Nejat Tumer, the commander of the Turkish Navy
General Sedat Celasun, the commander of the Turkish Gendarmerie Forces

3. Conclusion
The two cases of Turkey in 1980 and Thailand 1991 were preceded by social
unrest. The reason behind the formation of mixed coup agency was contributed to two
main aspects. First, the ability of the coordinator to liaise between different service
branches spontaneously at the moments of social unrest. Second, the ability of the
coordinator to utilize the state of social unrest as a persuasive asset to tempt potential
coup plotters who have different backgrounds and service branches to join his coup
plans. Both cases, Thailand 1991 and Turkey 1980, were coordinated from the top, by
the general commanders of the armed forces, General Kongsompong in Thailand and
General Evren in Turkey. These coordinators had direct influence over their
subordinates, the service branch commanders, and used this influence to summon
these commanders into special meeting where the coup plans were proposed after the
main coordinators have evaluated the state of social unrest. In these meetings, social
unrest was used by the coordinators from the top to convince the other commanders
of the coups’ essentiality as means of ending the state of social unrest. Their means of
persuasion included submitting intelligence reports on the state of social unrest and
the chaos that the country might face in case the military did not intervene. Both coup
coordinators were able to convince their subordinates, the service branches
commanders, to join the coup. These two cases illustrated how social unrest was
associated with mixed coups. However, this study does not entail, at the same time,
that social unrest is a causal factor that precedes instances of mixed coup for two
reasons. First a moment of social unrest might not be concluded by a coup instance.
Second, some moments of infantry coups were preceded by social unrest as would be
illustrated in the next chapter.
!
!
!
!
!
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Chapter 5
Instances of Infantry Coup D’état: Haiti 1991 and Niger 2010
Instances of infantry coups represented the majority of the successful military
coups that took place between 1980 till 2013 with a percentage of 64.7%. 43.3% of
these infantry coups were preceded by moments of social unrest, whereas 56.8% were
not preceded by any forms of social unrest. As discussed in the previous chapters, the
reasons behind an exclusive formation of military coup agency to one service branch
could be contributed to several factors including the presence or absence of social
unrest. One can categorize the infantry coup agency formation into two criteria. First,
an intentional exclusive coup agency formation scenario; In that case the main coup
plotter would have the ability to liaise between service branches due to his extensive
sphere of influence, yet he would intentionally ignore other service branches and
select coup associates from his own service branch. Second, an unintentional
exclusive coup agency formation; in that case, the main coup coordinator is incapable
of liaising and influencing other service branch rather than his own. Therefore, he
would not have any other choices rather than recruiting coup associates from his
restricted sphere of influence and end up in having an exclusive coup agency
formation. In this chapter, I selected two instances of infantry coup d’état that would
represent both scenarios and analyzed the chain reaction that could lead to exclusive
coup agency of infantry coups.
1. Haiti 1991
• Coup Status:!Preceded by No Social Unrest
! The election of the first democratically elected president
! Spread of the rule of law
! Cuts in the governmental budgets for the sake of national
development
! Popular support for the president against the coup attempt of
January 1991.
• Execution Day:!30.9.1991
• Belligerents:
! President Jean-Bertrand Aristide (Democratically Elected
president)
! General Raoul Cédras (The Military Commander in Chief)
• !Coup Type:! Infantry Coup (Intentional Exclusive Coup Agency
Formation)
• !Coordination Type:!From the Top
! Coup coordinated by the commander in chef of the Haitian Armed
Forces, FAD’H
• Result:
! The ouster of President Aristide and his cabinet in October 1991
! The installment of “The Three Stooges” military Junta from 19911994
! The re-installment of President Aristide by 1994 with the help of
the U.S. invasion force of Haiti

!
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The disbandment of the Haitian military institution by 1995

1.1 Prologue: Pre-Aristide Haiti
Haiti, a former French-Hispanic colony in the Caribbean Sea, was the first and
only country in the western hemisphere, in the 19th century, to defeat three of colonial
super powers of the 19th century (France, Britain and Spain) simultaneously during
the Haitian Slave Revolution of 1791.135 On the 1st of January 1804, Haiti gained its
independence, its military commander, General Jean-Jacque Dessalines, named
himself illegitimately as Emperor Jacques I of Haiti. 136 Ever since, the Haitian
military institution has constantly intervened in the Haitian political arena. Between
1986 and 1991, Haiti witnessed three successful military coups d’état. Prior to the
successful military coup that had put Haiti under military rule from 1991 till 1994,
Haiti witnessed two major political instances. First, Haiti witnessed its first free
democratic presidential elections under the supervision of the international
community and the military. 137 Second, Haiti witnessed a failed coup attempt
orchestrated by members of the Duvalierist ancién regime just after the conclusion of
the elections.138
The reaction of the military institution was quite exceptional to the two instances.
It was noticed that the military institution under the leadership of General Herard
Abraham was eager to give up power to the civilians. This eagerness was contributed
to 6 years of political turmoil caused the constant military interference in the political
arena.139 As for the coup attempt, the military high command reacted instantly and
sided with the people against the coup plotters.140 Some argued that the instant
military reaction was contributed to the pressure exerted by the international
observers, the U.S. and France. Others referred it to the unwillingness of a wide
spectrum in the military institution to support another coup, as they preferred to return
back to their barracks rather than having a political role. Regardless of the motives
behind the military high command’s reaction, they had indeed terminated the coup
attempt and successfully transferred powers to a democratically elected president on
the 7th of February 1991. On his first televised speech, just after stating the
presidential oath, the democratically elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide
announced the dismissal of 6 generals in the military high command as well as a
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number of colonels and majors.141 None rejected the presidential executive orders of
retirement, and even the military Commander in Chief, General Herard Abraham
preferred to resign before being “retired”. 142 President Aristide thought that
appointing younger officers in High Military Council would reform the military
doctrine and promote military professionalism. The successful Haitian infantry coup
of September 1991 proved that President Aristide was wrong.
1.2 Evaluation
“Aristide Ape Kouri Pou Lavalas, li tonbe nan gran riviye.” In traditional Creole,
Haiti’s formal language, these words meant: “Aristide ran away from small flooding
water to fall in a big river.”143 When Aristide promoted General Raoul Cédras to
appoint him as the military Commander in Chief; he thought that he could subdue the
military institution and avoid further coups.144 Aristide was wrong; the very same
general he appointed orchestrated a successful coup after only two months of his
appointment. General Cédras learned the mistakes of his predecessors. He knew that
his military post would be threatened as long as Aristide held the presidential post.
Therefore, for Cédras, he preferred to oust Aristide rather than being “retired” by
Aristide. In the absence of any form of social unrest, Cédras had to plan his steps very
carefully to make sure of his own survival even if the coup failed. Consequently, he
had to overcome two obstacles, if his coup plans were to succeed. First, Cédras had
to surpass the popular support enjoyed by President Aristide that made the February
1991 coup a failure. Second, he had to make sure that his coup plans were discrete
within the military institution as some officers, even in the High Military Command,
were quite supportive to Aristide and would have been ready to turn Cédras to a court
marshal if they had known plans.145 For instance, in July 1991, navy troops in Port Au
Prince declared their support and loyalty to President Aristide, and even went further
to arrest their base commander after accusing him of being a Duvalierist.146 Even
though, General Cédras was the Commander in Chief, he was liable to arrest as his
coup plans were illegal and incase these plans were unveiled, Cédras would have met
the same fate of the Port Au Prince navy base commander. For Cédras, the evaluation
process entailed two strategies; first, coordinating and executing the coup before any
unpredictable presidential decision of relieving him from duty. Second, coordinating
and executing the coup among potential coup plotters whom he trusted.
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1.3 Coordination
Due to the presence of a wide spectrum of military cadets who supported Aristide
and preferred to keep a distance between the military and politics, General Cédras had
to coordinate cautiously without leaving any loose ties that link him to the coup. The
coordination strategy of Cédras was actually the main motive behind my choice of
this case, as across the 68 coup cases, regardless of the coup type or coup status, the
coordination process of this case was the most interesting of them all. General Cédras
did not coordinate with the other coup plotters face-to-face, and even other coup
plotters were not even aware that General Cédras was the coup’s main coordinator.
General Cédras was quite aware that he is constantly under the surveillance of the
president and other military high commanders.147 Therefore, he resorted to an old
friend of his who retired from the military service. This old friend was the ex-colonel
Philippe Biamby who was a personal friend of General Cédras. Both Cédras and
Biamby were graduates of the (1971-1973) class.148 In addition, they had participated
in a failed coup attempt against President Avril Prosper in 1988. Cédras advised excolonel Biamby to limit his contacts to those who would tactically need to execute the
coup successfully. As for Cédras, he, as a commander in chief, made sure that the
executioners would not be assigned to serve far away from the capital.149
Ex-Colonel Biamby contacted two officers whom he personally known and served
with.150 These officers were: Colonel Jean-Claude Duperval the commander of the
Camp D’Application and Major Jospeh Michel Francois the commander of the
Cafeteria 4th Company.151 Biamby informed Cédras of the coup plotters names and
commanding posts to make sure that these nominees were granted the required
facilities and equipment needed for the coup. Cédras as a commander in chief,
ordered the transfer of armored vehicles and tanks to Camp D’Application in order to
grant the coup executioners land supremacy on one hand. On the other, he denied the
Presidential Palace Corps any Anti-Tank, AT, weaponry to limit any potential
resistance to the executioners.152 President Aristide became suspicious of the military
actions in Port Au Prince, and even asked General Cédras to re-assign Major Francois
another post away from the capital. General Cédras, in order not to lose one of his
main coup executioners, warned Aristide to act circumspectly over this matter,
otherwise, the president might face a wave of military mutinies, especially after his
courageous steps of dismissing several generals and colonels.153
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1.4 Execution
Four days after the return of President Aristide from New York, On the 29th of
September 1991 at 21:00, a mutiny started at the Cafeteria 4th Company under the
leadership of the artillery Major Joseph Francois.154 The mutineers declared their
resistance to Aristide regime. Unlike the coup plotters of the failed January 1991 coup
attempt, the plotters did not march towards Aristide’s residence. Instead, Major
Francois aligned himself with the armored corps of Camp D’Application under the
command of Colonel Duperval and occupied the main streets in Port Au Prince to
overcome any civilian resistance to their coup plans. 155 In the meanwhile, radio
stations started reporting violent clashes between some civilian loyalists and the
mutineers. President Aristide called General Cédras to inquire about the situation in
Port Au Prince. At this moment, General Cédras was playing politics with President
Aristide; he reassured Aristide that the military institution would defend the legitimate
president and that these mutineers would be easily crushed.156 It was later known that
General Cédras wanted to give the “mutineers” or his coup associates enough time to
make sure that the coup was a fait accompli.
By the 30th of October, Major Francois and Colonel Duperval marched towards the
presidential palace accompanied by armored vehicles and tanks from Camp
D’Application. One of the tanks posed its turret towards the Presidential Palace.157
The presidential guards who were denied to acquire AT, Anti Tank, weapons did not
stand chance against heavy armored troops and fled instantly leaving behind the
presidential palace vulnerable to the plotters attacks. The French ambassador at that
time, Jean Raphael Dufour, went instantly to Aristide’s residential place to protect
him. President Aristide, reassured by General Cédras that the situation is under
control, headed to the Presidential Palace. On his way to the presidential palace, the
Presidential Convoy was ambushed by the mutineers, and Captain Fritz Pierre-Louis
from the Presidential Personal Military Escort was gunned down.158 The mutineers
took Aristide into custody. Later on, Aristide found himself standing before the
mastermind of the coup General Cédras inside the General Headquarter.159 Only then,
President Aristide and other officers from the High Military Command knew that
there was a link between General Cédras and the mutineers. General Cédras informed
Aristide that he had nothing to do with the mutiny, and that it would be quite safer for
him to leave the country instantly. An escort secured Aristide’s delivery to Port Au
Prince’s Airport to make sure of his safety and departure.160
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1.5 Making A Fact
General Cédras, though he was the Commander in Chief, he still lacked influence
over loyalist high commanding officers installed by Aristide such as the deputy
commander in chief Colonel Alix Sylva and other members of the High Military
Council such as Colonel Marc Charles. Cédras convened with the High military
Council and informed them that the military had to take immediate actions to restore
stability. At 21:00 on the 30th of September, General Cédras broadcasted an
announcement to explain to the Haitian people why the military had to expel Aristide
out of the country. He argued that these were extra-ordinary measures taken to save
Haiti from prominent chaos.161 It is noteworthy to highlight that General Cédras was
unlike the traditional coup plotters who usually declared themselves instantly as
presidents. On the contrary, General Cédras avoided assuming presidency in order not
to provoke Aristide’s loyalists, especially, those within the military institution. He
announced the formation of small military council that would be in charge until peace
is restored. The council was formed of the following members.162
•
•
•

General Raoul Cédras, Commander in Chief
Colonel Alix Sylva, Deputy Commander in Chief
Colonel Marc Charles, member of the High Military Council

In the meanwhile, international reactions were supportive to Aristide and called for
the re-installation of Aristide as the democratic choice of the Haitian People. Cédras
reassured his fellow colleagues that it was his intention to restore democracy and help
in re-installing Aristide as president once more. President Aristide, accompanied by
delegations the OAS, returned back to Haiti to Port Au Prince Airport to hold
negotiations with the military council that already included two loyalists. The
mutineers, Cédras’s coup associates, threatened Sylva among other loyalist High
Military Council members that they would neither accept the return of Aristide nor be
passive about it. The meeting was concluded with the departure of Aristide and the
resignation of the threatened loyalists from the military who did not stand a chance
against the hard power of the angry mutineers.163 Only at this moment, General
Cédras revealed his influence on the mutineers, after he had taken out the loyalists
within the military institution and formed his real junta. He re-integrated Colonel
Biamby into the military and granted him the rank of a general and appointed him as a
member in the High Military Council alongside with the newly promoted Colonel
Jospeh Francois. As for Colonel Duperval, Cédras appointed him as his new Deputy
Commander in Chief instead of Colonel Alix Sylva.164 Even after getting rid of the
loyalists within the military institution, General Cédras did not assume the
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presidential post and preferred to install a puppet president, the head of the Supreme
Court, Judge Joseph Nerette.165
1.5.1 Military Posts of the Coup Plotters Before and After the Coup 166
•
•
•
•

General Raoul Cédras, Military Commander in Chief " Chair of the
Military Junta (Ground Forces)
Ex- Colonel Philippe Biamby " General Philip Biamby, Member of the
Military Junta and the High Military Council (Ground Forces)
Colonel Jean-Claude Duperval, Commander of the Camp D’Application
" Deputy Commander in Chief (Ground Forces)
Major Joseph Francois, Commander of the Cafeteria 4th Company -"
Colonel Jospeh Francois, Member of Military Junta and the High Military
Council (Ground Forces)

1.6 Analysis
Cédras was the military Commander in Chief and by extension he was able to
liaise between the Haitian different service branches such as the air force and navy.
On the contrary, he, intentionally, limited his potential coup plotters’ list to only those
whom he can trust and had served with before. The motives behind this intentional
exclusive coordination were quite clear, especially, after the naval mutiny incidence
of July. If Cédras had naively contacted other military personnel without having a
persuasive asset such as social unrest that could tempt the members of the military
high council to jointly intervene, he would have been arrested and trialed.
Consequently, Cédras coordinated carefully and did not reveal that he is the true coup
coordinator till it was late for the military high council to confront him. The infantry
coup case of Haiti in 1991 shows that even a coordinator from the top such as General
Cédras, regardless of his influence within the military institution, might be discrete
about his coup plans if he does not have a sufficient persuasive reason that legitimizes
his coup plans to his subordinates.
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2. Niger 2010
• Coup Status:!Preceded by Social Unrest
! The dismissal of the parliament by President Mamadou Tandja
! Provocation of the national constitution by President Tandja
! The marginalization of the political opposition forces
! Food Crisis contributed to aid cuts by international donors
! Popular protests calling for Tandja’s resignation or ouster to end
political marginalization and international isolation
• Execution Day:!18.2.2010
• Belligerents:
! President Mamadou Tandja
! Colonel Salou Djibo (Commander of the 121st Artillery Division)
• !Coup Type:!Infantry Coup
• !Coordination Type:!From the Middle/Bottom
! Coup coordinated by an artillery division commander
• Result:
! The ouster of President Tandja and his cabinet in
! The installment of the Counseil Suprême Pour la Restauration de
la Démocratie (CSRD), The Supreme Council for Democratic
Restoration as the ruling military junta under the leadership of
Colonel Saluo Djibo
2.1 Prologue
Niger, a West African country, was once a part of the French West Africa group
prior to its independence in 1958.167 By 1960, Niger founded its first regular military
institution Les Forces Armée Nigeriennes (FAN).168 The FAN was only composed of
two service branches, Air Force and Ground Force, due to the landlocked geographic
location of Niger. It only took the FAN personnel 13 years to execute their coup
d’état in 1974.169 Niger has spent 22 out of 57 years as an independent state under
military rule.170 The latest coup executed by the FAN took place on the 18th of
February and resulted in the ouster of President Mamadou Tandja.171 The coup was
preceded by social unrest contributed social mobilization organized by trade
syndicates and political opposition and catalyzed by aid cuts due to Tandja’s
authoritarian policies. The international reactions that succeeded the Nigerien coup
were quite passive as it neither condemned nor opposed the coup. 172 The case of
Niger in 2010 stands as a case study for the unintentional scenario of an infantry coup
coordinated from the middle/bottom at a moment of social unrest.
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2.2. Pre-coup Social Unrest
Before his second presidential term had come to an end, Tandja’s supporters
rallied in front of the Nigerien National Assembly, The Parliament, asking for a threeyear extension term for Tandja so that he can fulfill his developmental plans.173
Tandja replied back on the 8th of May 2009 that he cannot ignore “the popular calls
that demanded his stay” and declared a constitutional revision through which he
would be allowed to serve more.174 According to the Nigerien Constitution of 1999,
the president was allowed to serve only for consecutive two terms 5 years each.175
The constitution had prohibited any revisions on the numbers or length of the
presidential terms. 176 Tandja declared that he would revise the constitution so that he
could maintain his post as president for a third term. On the same day, 8th of May, 23
Parliamentary Members asked the constitutional court to rule on the presidential
decision. On the 25th of May, the Constitutional Court declared that the presidential
intention of revising the constitution would be unconstitutional, according to Article
136, and by extension, this would constitute a violation of the presidential oath.177
The president replied by dissolving the Parliament the next day. One month later, he
invoked Article 53 that grants him emergency power and dissolved the Constitutional
Court.178 Approximately ten thousand protestors rallied in the streets of Niamey to
call for Tandja’s resignation, and for the first time in the Nigerien history, joint strikes
took place by the main trade unions and opposition parties.179 The opposition called
the U.S. and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to exert
pressure on Tandja in order to restore the democratic order through preserving the
constitution and re-installing the dissolved Parliament and the Constitutional Court.
Tandja ignored the internal and international calls and announced a referendum on a
new constitution that would be supervised by an “appointed constitutional court” of
his choice by the 4th of August.180 The opposition and the trade unions announced that
they would not participate in the making of a new dictatorship and refused to
participate in the referendum.181 With the sole participation of Tandja and his political
allies, the constitutional revisions were applied with the acceptance of 92.5% of the
“voters”.182 The ECOWAS among other international organization declared that they
would proceed with aid cuts to Niger, which was a strike to Tandja’s regime knowing
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that foreign aid constituted 7.2% of the Nigerien GDP in 2009-2010.183 Opposition
parties accompanied by tens of thousands of protestors continued their rally in
Niamey to end Tandja’s unconstitutional third term.
2.3 Evaluation
The military High Command, resembled in the Joint Chief of Staff and the
Commanders of the Service Branches, was quite co-opted into Tandja’s regime.
Tandja tended to transfer sizable cash sums to his Joint Chief of Staff, General
Bourema Moumouni, along with other top officers in exchange of their loyalty and
control over the FAN.184 Measures as such were a part of Tandja’s coup proofing
strategy to neutralize the military high command. Therefore, the only possibility for a
military intervention against Tandja was through those who belong to the middle or
the bottom of the FAN. Colonel Salou Djibo, the coup’s coordinator, was the
commander of the 121st Artillery Division stationed in Niamey’s suburbs.185 As a
Division Commander, assessing the chances of success was quite risky. His influence
over other fighting squads was restricted to either men whom he had served with
before and trust or men under his direct command. In addition, he knew that there
would be a very high possibility of a military confrontation with those who were loyal
to Tandja. The evaluation process for Djibo entailed two strategies. First, making use
of the social unrest and the opposition calls for a military intervention against Tandja.
Second, carefully selecting potential coup plotters who could be trusted to execute a
successful coup. The first strategy was contributed to a moment of regime weakness
that could be exploited due to the popular uprising against Tandja. By extension, this
popular uprising would legitimize any military intervention against Tandja and his
cabinet.186 Whereas the second strategy was contributed to reduce any risk of leaking
intelligence on the coup plans to the high command for the sake of the coup’s success.
2.4 Coordination
Djibo’s selection of potential coup associates was quite remarkable. Three
restrictions shaped Djibo’s selection process. The first restriction was his limited
sphere of influence. As a Division Commander, Djibo’s sphere of influence was
limited to either men under his command or those whom he had served with before.
The second restriction was carefully selecting within his sphere of influence men
whom he can trust and depend on, so that he can avoid any leak of intelligence about
his coup plans to the military high command. The third restriction was the tactical
necessity, which was about selecting only those whom he would tactically and
strategically need to execute a successful coup. Djibo selected three colonels whom
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he trusted and participated with in executing the 1999 coup. Starting with the first
associate, Colonel Djibrila Hima, the Commander of the 1st Defense Zone of
Niamey.187 Colonel Hima’s Defensive Division constituted the main defense line for
Niamey against any coup plotters. By including Hima in the coup, Djiba secured his
troops a safe passage to Niamey. The second associate was Colonel Goukoye Abdul
Karimou from the military intelligence. Including Colonel Karimou to the coup
granted Djiba an access to sufficient information that he needed for the coup’s
execution.188 Taking into consideration that without Karimou, Djiba would not have
had access to information, as he was merely a Division Commander. As for the third
and last associate, it was Colonel Adamou Harouna from the Green Berets, Special
Forces.189 Including Colonel Harouna alongside his men was a necessity to take over
the presidential palace and capture the president with minimal loss of lives.
In a personal interview with Les Voix Du Monde, Colonel Djiba stated he
coordinated with his coup associates on the execution day.190 Colonel Djiba might
have preferred to generate common knowledge of his coup intentions to his coup
associates for security reasons; especially, after he had planned everything. Djiba
selected February the 18th as the execution day for two reasons. First, there would be
a cabinet meeting at the presidential palace, which means that taking over the
presidential palace would be same as taking over all the power centers represented in
the figureheads of Tandja’s regime.191 Second, Tandja announced a military football
tournament in Niamey for the “entertainment of the FAN”, and this meant the
presence of many military key figures in Niamey to participate in the tournament, and
by extension, they were unarmed and would pose no threat to the plotters’ force.192
Djibo informed his coup associates of his plans after summoning them quietly to his
base without raising any suspicions to area military commander who might have
reported them to the high command. The meeting lasted for a few hours and was
concluded by the approval of the coup associates to the Djibo’s plans.193
2.5 Execution
The execution plan was dependent on the element of surprise. In other words,
transferring the coup plotters forces to the capital and taking over the presidential
palace before the High Military Command mobilizes any forces against the coup
plotters. Colonel Djibo loaded his light armored trucks with soldiers for the sake of
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quick mobility and headed for Niamey without any resistance from Colonel Hima’s
defensive forces. 194 By midafternoon, Djibo stationed his forces around the
presidential palace and fight started between the presidential guard and the Djibo’s
forces. Djibo concentrated his attacks on the presidential palace to secure the coup
success and ignored other secondary objectives such as taking over radio stations or
airport due to the lack of sufficient men for secondary missions. Eyewitnesses
confirmed seeing several corpses from both sides during the fight.195 While Djibo was
engaging the presidential guards to distract them, Colonel Harouna infiltrated with his
men to the presidential palace and arrested Tandja and his cabinet including his joint
chief of staff General Moumani. It took Djibo’s forces 25-30 minutes to take over the
presidential palace and arrest the president alongside his cabinet.196 The plan was
executed so swift that it was too late for any of the loyalist forces to reach Niamey
and defend the president before his arrest.
2.6 Making A Fact
The national radio station was active and reported the hearing of gunshots in the
parameter of the presidential palace. 197 Shortly before 18:00, news broadcast stopped
on the radio stations and it started broadcasting military music instead. By the late
evening, Colonel Goukoye Abdul Karimou headed to the national T.V., surrounded
by his soldiers, and declared the suspension of the constitution and the dissolution of
all the state’s institutions. 198 Furthermore, Colonel Karimou announced the
establishment of the Counseil Suprême Pour la Restauaration de la Démocratie
(CSRD), The Supreme Council for Democratic Restoration as a transitional council
led by Colonel Djibo. 6 days later, on the 24th of February, the junta, headed by
colonel Djibo, justified its intervention by referring to the following points:199
!
!
!

Putting an end to the large scale corruption instituted by Tandja
Putting an end to political centralization
Putting an end to the continued poverty

Further more the junta announced its main objectives to:
!
!
!

Restore democracy through fair and free elections
Reunite the Nigerien population
End national disorder
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!
!

Improve the socio-economic including the Food crisis that threatened “8
million people”
Ending international isolation

2.6.1 CSRD Junta Members
The junta was constituted of Colonel Djibo and his associates from the ground forces.
The Junta included the following officers:200
!
!
!
!
3

Colonel Salou Djibo, Chair of the CSRD.
Colonel Goukoye Abdul Karimou, the spokesman and of the CSRD
Colonel Djibrila Hima, CSRD Member
Colonel Adamou Harouna, CSRD Member

Haiti V.S. Niger

The two cases of Haiti in 1991 and Niger in 2010 represent two successful
instances of infantry coup d’état. The former case was coordinated by the military
commander in chief that lies on the top of the military institution, whereas an artillery
company commander coordinated the latter. Both coordinators selected only men
whom they can trust and depend on for the sake of the coup’s success. Yet, in the
Haitian case, the coup coordinator had indeed the ability to liaise between different
service branches as his sphere of influence reached all the military institution.
Regardless of this ability, he intentionally preferred to select certain coup associates
to execute his plans and excluded others. Whereas in the Nigerien case of 2010, the
coup coordinator’s sphere of influence was restricted, and by extension, he was forced
to recruit only men who lie within his sphere of influence. I assumed that the presence
or absence of social unrest could determine the coup coordinator’s behavior in
selecting his coup associates regardless of the coordination type. In the case of Haiti,
the absence of social unrest had indeed led General Cédras to coordinate with men
whom he trust as he lacked a persuasive reason to recruit members of the High
Military Council. This behavior was intentional. As for the case of Niger, social
unrest was quite present, yet Colonel Djibo, as a Company Commander, did not
possess enough influence that could extend to other service branches. By extension,
he recruited coup associates within his sphere of influence to execute the coup in the
midst of Tandja’s moment of weakness. The above hypothesis, however, does not
entail that the presence or the absence of social unrest is the only factor that
determines the coup agency formation. Yet, it entails presence or absence of social
unrest is one factor that could impact the coup agency formation.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The military institution is often perceived as one cohesive unit. Its cohesion is
defined by bounding its members to sustain one will, one organization and one
mission.201 This perspective has indeed influenced the study of civil-military relation
ever since its inception. By extension, the study of military coups d’état, an aspect of
civil-military relation, was impacted by the very same perspective on cohesiveness.
The aim of this thesis is not to show that the academic perspective on military
cohesiveness is not true. I assume in this thesis that some instances of military coup
d’état, more specifically instances of infantry coups, show that military cohesiveness
might not be always the case with the military behavior. This assumption is stemmed
from perceiving the military institution as an interaction among its members who
belong to different service branches according to the structural organization of the
military institution. I assume that it is the nature of these interactions that determines
the cohesiveness or the dividedness of the military institution with regards decisions
such as coups d’état. This was possible through analyzing the coup agency of
successful military coup instances in a limited time frame.
Analyzing the coup agency of successful military coups was possible through
gathering information on the service branches, ranks, and military posts of the coup
plotters with regards to the respective coup instances. The primary analysis showed
that there were two categories of military coups. The first category was named as
mixed coups. In this category, coup agency formation included members from
different service branches. On the other hand, the second category aroused out of a
more exclusive coup agency formation; it was named as infantry coups. In this
category, coup agency formation included only members from the ground force
regiments. The occurrence of infantry coups shows that the military members’
behavior might not be of a cohesive nature at some instances of military anti-regime
actions such as an instance of a military coup. Therefore, the crux of the thesis was
focused on investigating these two categories, mixed and infantry coup, to puzzle out
three questions; what are these categories? Why do we have at some instances mixed
coup and at others infantry ones? And how mixed and infantry coups are evaluated,
coordinated and executed?
I utilized a mixed method research of both a quantitative and a qualitative nature to
investigate the different coup types as a means to answer the questions mentioned
above. The primary data analysis showed that 64.7% of the successful military coup
instances between 1980 and 2013 were infantry coups, whereas only 35.3% were
mixed coups. This analysis showed that there were only two types: mixed and
infantry coups. This result entailed two assumptions about coup plotters’ service
branches. First, plotters from the ground forces were able to execute successful
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military coups d’états independently without involving other officers from other
service branches. Second, plotters from the other regular service branches of the
armed forces, air force and navy, were not able to execute a successful coup
independently without the engagement of the ground forces.
To answer the why question, I applied a deeper analysis to examine the common
aspects shared by each coup type. It was found that 100% of the mixed coup instances
were preceded by moments of social unrest. As for the infantry coups, only 43.2% out
of the infantry coup cases were preceded by moments of social unrest, and 56.8% of
the infantry coup cases were not preceded by any form of social unrest. These
percentages did not show any causal relation between moments of social unrest and a
specific coup type. 100% of the mixed coups were preceded by moments of social
unrest, yet this does not mean that moments of social unrest would cause a coup, as
still some infantry coup cases were preceded by moments of social unrest.
Furthermore, some moments of social unrest were not even concluded by a military
coup. As a result, there was a missing link that associates the absence or the presence
of social unrest with coup types. The answer to this missing link was found in the how
question; how mixed and infantry coups are evaluated, coordinated and executed?
The exclusiveness or inclusiveness of coup agency formation depends solely on
the coup’s coordination process. If the main coup coordinator can coordinate and
share his coup plans with officers from different service branches, then the coup
agency formation would be of an inclusive nature, and by extension the coup would
be a mixed coup. On the other hand, if the coup coordinator was unable to coordinate
with coup associates from different service branches, whether intentionally or
unintentionally, then the coup agency formation would be of an exclusive nature, and
by extension the coup would be an infantry coup. In chapter 2, I discussed these
possible scenarios through identifying the coup as a process of evaluation,
coordination and execution.
The coup’s evaluation process was first introduced by scholars such as Holger
Albrecht and Clayton Thyne. Albrecht argued that the evaluation process is a process
through which the coup plotters evaluate and wait for a moment of fragility that
provides them with a window of opportunity through which they can operate and oust
the regime incumbent.202 Thyne went further to hypothesize that the likelihood of
coups is directly proportional to the regime’s fragility. 203 Once the main coup
coordinator concludes his evaluation for the regime’s moment of weakness, he would
start the coordination process through which he would recruit his coup associates he
would need for a successful coup execution. Only at this moment, the coup
coordinator would decide either to form a mixed coup agency or an inclusive one.
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However, there are some factors that influence the coup coordinator’s decision. These
factors were the ability of the coup coordinator to liaise between different service
branches, and the presence of a persuasive factor such as social unrest that can tempt
officers from different service branches to join the coup.
Mixed Coups
I hypothesized that the strong correlation between mixed coups and social unrest
was dependent on the two factors that I discussed above. These coups were
coordinated by a coup coordinator who had the ability to liaise between different
service branches. Those who have this ability are more likely to be either a minister of
defense or a joint chief of staff, as these are the only military posts that assume
command over all the service branches. Yet, the ability to liaise between service
branches is something, and the ability to convince officers from different service
branches to join an illegal act such as executing a coup is another thing. Here comes
the role of social unrest; it would work as a persuasive asset that could be utilized by
those who can liaise between service branches to convince officers from different
service branches to execute the coup. The coup coordinator would tempt these
officers to join the coup as a means of ending chaos and restoring peace and stability
to infer the military role as a bulwark against chaos.204 At this moment, the coup
coordinator and his coup associates would agree on a zero hour to execute their coup.
Here comes the next phase, the execution process. In this process, the coup
coordinator would execute the coup through seizing power centers such as the
Parliament, Presidential Palace among other strategic targets that can include:
airports, radio stations, TV stations, communication facilities and roads that lead to
the political capital. When they accomplish these tactical objectives, they would
announce their coup success and their future plans that could include the formation of
a military junta that assumes control over the political scene.
Infantry Coups
Some infantry coup instances were preceded by moments of social unrest, 43.2%,
whereas others were not preceded by any forms of social unrest. These coups were
coordinated by a coup coordinator who either intentionally or unintentionally
recruited his coup associates exclusively from one service branch, which is in that
case the ground force. I assumed that the exclusive behavior of the coup coordinator
would be intentional; when he has the ability to liaise between different service
branches, yet avoid coordinating with any officer from these branches. On the other
hand, this behavior would be unintentional; when the coup coordinator does not have
the ability of liaising between service branches due to the restricted influence of his
military post that can only influence officers from the same service branch. I assumed
that intentional scenario might be applied to coordinators from the top, middle and
bottom as it only depends on the ability of the coordinator, regards of his military
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post, to liaise between branches. As for the unintentional scenario, I assumed that it
could be only applied to coup coordinators from the middle or the bottom, as they are
less likely to be able to liaise between different branches. In addition, their
counterparts from the top have the ability to liaise between branches, so their
exclusive behavior could only be intentional. As for the presence of social unrest, it
would represent a moment of regime’s fragility that the coup coordinator regardless
of his military post, a window of opportunity through which he can coordinate and
execute his coup.
Data Findings
In chapter 3, I introduced the data gathered for this research to quantitatively test
the theoretical framework introduced in chapter 2. The data analysis was concluded
with the following findings:
•

•

•
•
•
•

Plotters from the ground forces were able to execute successful military coups
d’états independently without involving other officers from other service
branches.
Plotters from the other regular service branches of the armed forces, air force
and navy, were not able to execute a successful coup independently without the
engagement of the ground forces.
Coups preceded by social unrest were more likely to be coordinated from the top
Coordinators from the top were more likely to coordinate mixed coups at
moments of social unrest.
Coordinators from the middle/bottom were more likely to coordinate infantry
coups regardless of the coup status.
Coup coordinators were more likely to coordinate infantry coups at moments of
no social unrest.

The data analysis showed a strong correlation between mixed coup coordination
levels, more specifically coordination from the top, with mixed coup cases that were
all preceded by social unrest. On the other hand, infantry coups were correlated more
with coordinators from the middle/bottom regardless of the presence or absence of
social unrest. One of the interesting findings that the data showed, in the successful
coup cases from 1980-2013, is that at moments of no social unrest, the coup
coordinator tended to have an exclusive coup agency formation regardless of the
coordination level. The absence of social unrest, in this case, means the absence of a
persuasive reason that could be used by the coup coordinator, regardless the
coordination level, to coordinate with officers from different service branches. On the
other hand, when social unrest was present, and the coup coordinator was able to
liaise between service branches, the coup coordinator tended to have an inclusive
coup agency formation that included different service branches.
In chapter 4 and 5, the four case studies of Thailand 1991, Turkey 1980, Haiti 1991
and Niger 2010 were selected to introduce the different scenarios of the different coup
types taking into consideration the geographical distribution of the sample as well as
the time frame of each case. The two cases of Thailand and Turkey represent the sole
!
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scenario for a mixed coup. On the other hand, the case selection for chapter 5 had to
cover both the intentional and unintentional exclusive coup agency formation by the
coup plotters regardless of the coordination level. The four cases showed how the
moments of mixed and infantry coups were evaluated, coordinated and executed. In
addition, these four cases showed how the absence or presence of social unrest was
instrumental in the coup agency formation when exploited by coup coordinator.
The cases of Thailand and Turkey that represented two different regime types were
preceded by instances of social unrest that presented moments of regime fragility. The
coup coordinators of both cases were from the top of the armed forces. These
coordinators were able to utilize the state of social unrest to tempt their coup
associates, the commanders of the service branches, to execute the coup as a means of
ending chaos and restoring peace. On the other hand, the cases of Niger and Haiti
represented two different scenarios of the infantry coups that could be executed with
regards to the different coordination level of each case. These scenarios were the
intentional and unintentional scenarios. The infantry coup instance of Niger in 2010
represented the unintentional scenario. It was preceded by a moment of social unrest
due to its 2009 constitutional crisis. Due to the co-optation of the Nigerien High
Military Council by President Tandja, the only chance for a military intervention
came from the middle/bottom of the Nigerien Armed forces. Colonel Djibo, the
Nigerien coup coordinator evaluated the social unrest as a window of opportunity to
coordinate and execute a coup at a moment of regime fragility. He, unintentionally,
coordinated and shared his coup plans to officers from his own service branch due to
his restricted influence on other service branches and ended up with an exclusive coup
agency formation. On the other hand, the infantry coup instance of Haiti in 1991
represented the intentional scenario. It was intentionally coordinated among carefully
selected coup plotters regardless of the military post of the coup coordinator, general
Cédras, as the Commander in Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces. Due to the absence
of social unrest in this case, General Cédras lacked a persuasive asset that could have
convinced the commanders of the other service branches to join his coup plans.
Ultimately, Cédras, intentionally, coordinated his coup exclusively.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research
This thesis aimed at giving a new perspective to the military institution. This new
perspective entailed considering the military institution as an institution whose
cohesiveness is dependent on the nature of the interactions among its military
members who have different affiliations with regards to their service branches.
Applying this perspective to military coups d’état has resulted in the introduction of
two coup categories; mixed and infantry coups. This different categorization of
military coups means that the traditional perspective on the military institution as one
cohesive unit might not be always the case.
The thesis encountered some limitations. For instance, the data analysis was
restricted to a specific time frame, between 1980-2013, and not earlier. This limitation
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has constrained the number of case studies to 68 coup cases. Second, the data only
focused on the successful instances of military coups d’état instead of focusing on
both successful and unsuccessful coups. The reason behind this limitation is that the
academic literature lacked sufficient information on coup attempts in terms of the
names and the military posts of the coup plotters. This does not mean that the thesis
ignored the importance of coup attempts in understanding the military behavior.
However, excluding coup attempts was contributed to the lack of sufficient literature
on the coup plotters of these attempts. It would be highly recommended for future
research on civil-military relation to acknowledge that military cohesiveness might
not be always the case. Henceforth, perceiving the military institution as a network
interaction might give us better understanding various anti-regime military actions
rather than military coups such as defection, mutiny or shirking.
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Codebook
Variable

Description

country

Country Name

ccode

Country codes corresponding to Gleditsch and Ward
(1991)

Year

Year of the successful coup moment

month

Month of the successful coup moment

day

Day of the successful coup moment

Groundforces

The percentage of the coup plotters affiliated to the
Ground Forces within the coup agency formation

Navy

The percentage of the coup plotters affiliated to Navy
within the coup agency formation

Airforce

The percentage of the coup plotters affiliated to the Air
Force within the coup agency formation

Paramilitary

The percentage of the coup plotters affiliated to the
Paramilitary Forces within the coup agency formation

Police

The percentage of the coup plotters affiliated to the
Police within the coup agency formation

CoupLeaderServiceBranch

1= Ground Forces; 2= Air Force; 3= Navy; 4=
Paramilitary; 5= Police

CoupType

1= Infantry Coup; 2= Mixed Coup

PrecededStatus

1=Coup preceded by a moment of social unrest; 2=
Coup preceded by no moment of social unrest

CoordinatorClass

1= Coordinator from the top of the military institution;
2= Coordinator from the middle/bottom of the military
institution
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Data Set
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